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THE U.S. financial system has changed greatly in the past twenty years 
and will unquestionably continue to evolve in response to challenges and 
opportunities. In this paper I survey a number of important innovations 
that have occurred in an attempt to  understand the forces that led  to 
change and the consequences the innovations have for the future conduct 
of monetary policy.  As will be seen, each of the innovations is itself a 
response to conditions that existed in money and capital markets on some 
date.  Indeed,  it  can be  claimed  that each  innovation was  induced  by 
monetary policy decisions that were taken before that date. 
Individually and collectively  the innovations  probably have had  an 
expansive effect on the economy,  because it is likely that each led to a 
decline in the required rate of return for holding capital.' The new finan- 
cial instruments and institutions are competing successfully with assets, 
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1. The issue, as usual, hinges upon whether all assets in the private sector's port- 
folio are gross substitutes.  The innovations considered in this paper have tended to 
nullify regulatory interferences  such as reserve requirements  and interest rate ceil- 
ings on deposits. In the absence of such regulatory interferences,  the assumption  of 
gross substitutability  leads to the prediction  in the text. See James  Tobin and William 
C. Brainard,  "Financial  Intermediaries  and the Effectiveness  of Monetary  Controls," 
American  Economic  Review,  vol.  53  (May  1963,  Papers  and  Proceedings,  1962), 
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liabilities, and institutions that existed before 1960. The resulting richer 
mixture of saving and investing mediums is very likely to augment invest- 
ment flows and reduce the inconveniences of holding physical capital. A 
given monetary base or stock of outside money will be associated with a 
larger equilibrium stock (fund)  of capital. 
In this analysis a monetary authority that wants to  achieve a target 
level  of  economic  activity probably should  reduce the  growth rate of 
monetary aggregates or increase interest rates when it perceives that in- 
novations  are occurring. However,  its  action  might be  self-defeating. 
There is no assurance that its objective can be achieved more than tem- 
porarily; it may just spawn another round of innovations. 
A basic tenet of this paper is that monetary policy is poorly designed 
if it fails to take into account the possibility that conditions which result 
from policy changes may lead to innovations. Optimally designed mone- 
tary policy is based on a model or hypothesis about behavior by house- 
holds, firms, and financial institutions in an economy. When innovations 
occur, behavior by some of these decisionmakers is modified. A model 
that fails to allow for such change is misspecified and cannot be trusted 
to guide policymakers. 
Depending upon the nature of innovations, policy based on the mis- 
specified model can err in a variety of ways. If an innovation leads to the 
formation of a new financial institution or financial instrument, obviously 
the misspecified model can say nothing about either. Drawing upon re- 
sults from the optimal control literature, the appendix provides an im- 
pressionistic discussion of three slightly more tractable cases in which a 
single parameter in a model is assumed, alternatively, to be random, pro- 
portional to some exogenous variable in the model,  or proportional to 
some endogenous variable in the model. The last is argued to be similar 
in spirit to  the rational expectations hypothesis. The  conclusion  to  be 
drawn from the discussion in the appendix is that the problem of attempt- 
ing to design optimal monetary policy has been considerably complicated 
by the presence of changing parameters, whatever their source. 
It is not a conclusion that such adversity leads inevitably to inactivity, 
constant money growth rates, and the demise of discretion. Paleontology 
teaches us that the only viable option is to  adapt to changing circum- 
stances. The challenge is to understand the nature of change and to re- 
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A Simple Example of Innovation 
Suppose a central bank has a single policy instrument, H, the volume 
of outside money, which it controls perfectly. In this example banks are 
assumed always to be at the limit of their capacity to lend and households 
desire no currency; the required reserves of the banking system equals 
the volume of outside money. The banking system is assumed to be purely 
competitive and to have an aggregative balance sheet like the following. 
Assets  Liabilities 
Reserves  Demand deposits 
Loans  Borrowings (after an 
innovation occurs) 
Deposits  are subject to a reserve requirement, r, and initially are the 
only liability the banks have. Bank borrowing is an innovation that is off- 
stage'  waiting to happen; borrowings are not subject to reserve require- 
ments. The  innovation is  assumed to  be  irreversible. Once it happens 
everyone can see the value of it, but it will not be made until set-up costs 
for promotion, legal investigations, and the establishment of a secondary 
market can be recouped. The interest rate paid on borrowings is equal 
to the interest rate earned on loans because the cost of intermediating at 
the margin is assumed to be negligible. The interest rate that banks im- 
plicitly pay on demand deposits is assumed always to be less than the loan 
rate. 
The demand for deposits (or Ml ) by the public is given by 
(1)  MD==ao-ali+a2Y+u, 
where 
i =  interest rate on loans 
Y =  nominal value of national income 
u =  a random variable. 
The demand for loans by the public is given by 
(2)  LD=bo-bli+b2Y+v, 
where v is another random variable. 
By taking into account the banking system's two balance sheet identi- 
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money markets clear, the system can be solved for Y and i. In such a sim- 
ple model, a few conditions on parameters are required to assure that an 
increase in outside money will cause income to rise and the interest rate 
to fall. Before the innovation occurs, the following conditions on outside 
money multipliers are sufficient: 
(3)  (i  _  a2(1-r)-b2  <  O  d  Y  al(-r)_-bi  >  0 
()  H  r(alb2 -bia2)  <  OH  r(alb2 -  bia2) 
An innovation is assumed to occur if i ever rises above some threshold 
level,  iT,  because then loan income can be seen to cover set-up costs in 
this myopic world.2 If the innovation occurs, borrowings become positive 
and thereafter the amount of borrowed funds that the public supplies to 
banks is given by 
(4)  Bs =co  +  Cli  + c2Y  +  w, 
where w is a random variable. Other parameters in the model would prob- 
ably change after the innovation occurs, depending on how  the public 
trades off bank borrowings with demand deposits,  loans,  and physical 
capital. For simplicity, this potentially serious complication is ignored in 
the present discussion.3 In general, the system is still closed because one 
more equation and one more unknown have been added. The condition 
for clearing the loan market becomes LS =  H(1  -  r)/r  +  Bs. After the 
innovation the outside money multipliers of the interest rate, income, and 
borrowings are 
Oi  a2(1-r)-(b2-c2) 
OH  r[al(b2  -  c2)-  a2(b, +  cl)]' 
aY  _  al(1-r)-(b,  +  cl) 
(H  r[al(b2  -  c2)-  a2(b  +  cl)]' 
OB  (1 -  r)(cia2 +  c2aj)  -  b2c1 -  b1c2 
OH  r[al(b2  -  c2)-  a2(b, +  cl)] 
Even in this simplest case it is not possible to assign positive or nega- 
2.  If  interest rates were not sufficiently flexible to  clear markets, a  resulting 
"credit crunch" could also precipitate an innovation. See Albert M. Wojnilower, 
"The Central Role of Credit Crunches  in Recent Financial History,"  BPEA, 2:1980, 
pp. 277-326. 
3. With the assumptions  in the text, deposits and borrowings are neither substi- 
tutes nor complements  and the innovation is unambiguously  expansionary.  The vol- 
ume of loans supported  by outside money, H, is not diminished by the innovation, 
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tive signs to changes in the first two Ml  multipliers when the inequalities 
in equation 3 are satisfied. The sign of the third multiplier cannot be de- 
termined without information about the ratio of  cl  to  c2. Because  the 
relation between Ml  and H is unaffected by the innovation, correspond- 
ing indeterminacies exist for the three Ml  multipliers. 
Policy actions can still be helpful after an innovation has occurred if 
the signs of the multipliers themselves are known to be unchanged. The 
consequences of policy actions are likely to be less predictable because 
parameter values in equation 4  are likely to  be  unknown. The  degree 
of predictability is smaller the larger the absolute values of the parame- 
ters. All  innovations discussed below  started on  a small scale; thus for 
several years parameters such as c0,  cl,  and c2 were small in  absolute 
value and not likely to have reversed the signs of multipliers in a static 
model.4 
By assumption the innovation in this discussion came from allowing 
the interest rate to exceed  a particular threshold level.  The innovation 
could have been prevented by allowing the supply of outside money to 
increase, but at the cost of experiencing a higher level of nominal income. 
There is a trade-off between the achievement of short-run targets in nomi- 
nal income and the preservation of  a given financial institutional struc- 
ture. Random developments, expressed in the shock terms in behavioral 
equations, could cause the innovation to occur at any time; but policy can 
make it happen. Keeping interest rates under control reduces the rate of 
innovation but limits the contribution that monetary policy  can  make 
toward achieving stabilization goals in the  short run. By  intentionally 
missing some short-run goals, the monetary authorities can better control 
the system over time. 
The usefulness of monetary aggregates as a guide to monetary policy 
would  be  further compromised if  it were determined that borrowings 
belong in the definition of  money.  The  reason is that there would  no 
longer be a known relation between the policy instrument and money. 
As  Marschak suggests, with  sufficient thought  and observation  the 
postinnovation multipliers might eventually be  estimated.5 Data  would 
4.  In the appendix to this paper it is argued that a different conclusion about 
impact multipliers  is likely to occur in a dynamic model. 
5. Jacob Marschak, "Economic Measurements for Policy  and Prediction," in 
William C. Hood and Tjalling C. Koopmans, eds., Studies in Econometric Method 
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need to be collected rapidly after an innovation is thought to have oc- 
curred. In this case, monetary policy could be conducted as it was in the 
preinnovation period. On the other hand, there are likely to be many 
such "ratchet"  innovations standing in the wings; it seems more plausible 
that high and fluctuating interest rates, policy-induced or not, will per- 
sistently keep policymakers somewhat in the dark. 
Innovations in the Postwar Period 
The preceding example and the discussion in the appendix suggest that 
innovation can disrupt the conduct of monetary policy  when policy  is 
optimally designed based on a previously reliable macroeconomic model. 
Actual monetary policy is not premised on the existence of such a model. 
The Federal Reserve's model does provide numbers that are available at 
meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee, but that model is cer- 
tainly not accepted uncritically. Nevertheless, it is a convenient fiction to 
think that policy is conducted in the optimal manner. Therefore, in the 
remainder of this paper the term model refers to this hypothetical con- 
struct rather than to any real-world counterpart. 
Innovations take many forms and are made by different individuals 
and firms in an economy. The next section discusses seven major innova- 
tions that have occurred in the past twenty years. All  have profoundly 
affected U.S.  financial markets and intermediaries but in very different 
ways.  Commercial banks have  been  the  principal innovators in  three 
cases:  negotiable  certificates of  deposit,  one-bank  holding  companies, 
and Eurobranching. Political pressures have led  Congress and two ad- 
ministrations to establish federal credit programs that provide a variety 
of intermediation services. Securities dealers were primarily responsible 
for developing repurchase agreements, but commercial banks and their 
customers made them quantitatively important for interpreting monetary 
policy.  Brokerage firms created money-market mutual funds. The  Chi- 
cago Board of Trade established financial-instrument futures markets. 
The descriptions of innovations that follow contain a great amount of 
institutional detail, but the underlying proposition  is  that each  of  the 
innovations is likely to have changed behavioral relations importantly in 
the model linking monetary policy instruments to the rest of the economy. 
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formation about individual innovations are not known, it is not possible 
to test this proposition directly. Interest rates and some other fragmentary 
time series are used to illustrate how the innovations have affected money 
and capital markets in the United States. 
The last section draws some conclusions  about the consequences  of 
these innovations. It focuses briefly on recognition lags, on the dangers 
of using monetary aggregates as indicators, on innovation and the struc- 
ture of interest rates, and on deregulation. 
ORIGINS 
Financial institutions alleviate the burdens of wealth holding and im- 
prove the allocation of investment flows. They exist because borrowers 
and lenders have incomplete information about each other and their ac- 
tivities and because of  economies  of  scale in data processing and risk 
bearing. In part, information is  incomplete  because  it  is prohibitively 
expensive to accumulate and sort all that might be known about people. 
If all people  and activities could be viewed as drawn from a stationary 
probability distribution, knowledge about the distribution would increase 
with the passage of time and financial markets would change. In the ab- 
sence of risk aversion, one would expect financial institutions to wither 
away as if they were a state described in Das  Kapital.  In these circum- 
stances an economist might be justified in viewing changes in the financial 
market as technical progress since change is a consequence  of  an im- 
proved sorting process. 
A more important explanation of incomplete information, in my view, 
is that people and their activities are not reasonably viewed as drawn from 
a stationary distribution. People are born and die, and scientific advances 
change the opportunities available to people who borrow and lend. The 
fact that the  relevant distributions are not  stationary raises profound 
questions about the scientific foundations of economic  science and sta- 
tistical method that are beyond the scope of this paper. When financial 
markets make a contribution in a nonstationary world, it is by anticipat- 
ing how technology and people are evolving. 
Changes in  financial markets reflect these  underlying technological 
changes; they also reflect environmental changes that involve the mix of 
assets, regulations, and market power in a society. At the cost of over- 
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here as resulting from a small number of underlying forces:  rising and 
increasingly volatile  nominal interest rates, regulations and regulatory 
changes, and ambiguities in  domains of  surveillance by monetary and 
fiscal authorities. Technical progress in  data processing has  also  been 
important in increasing the pace of innovation. 
The history of financial markets since 1945 is a blend of recovery from 
gross  distortions  that  were  introduced  by  the  Great  Depression  and 
World War II and an extremely spirited struggle for market shares under 
a disintegrating regulatory fabric. Between  1945  and sometime between 
1957  and 1962,  U.S.  depository institutions moved from a position of 
gross portfolio disequilibrium toward a situation approaching a balanced 
competitive struggle. During this fifteen-year period,  innovations were 
relatively infrequent and interest rates slowly drifted upward; comixier- 
cial banks reduced the fraction of  their portfolio  held  as U.S.  govern- 
ment securities and chose to forgo matching the high interest rates on 
time and savings deposits that were being offered by thrift institutions. 
As interest rates rose, institutions such as the federal funds market be- 
came more active. 
Commercial banks apparently abstained from competing for time and 
savings deposits with interest rates during the early part of this period 
because they had an ample stock of securities to liquidate and because 
they had a large market share of consumer deposits. Savings and loan 
associations had been crippled by the depression and war much more 
than commercial or mutual savings banks. Beginning in  1945,  savings 
and loan  associations  paid relatively high interest rates and began to 
grow rapidly. However, for many years their share of deposits in local 
markets was so small that it was not profitable for banks to match the 
interest rates being offered. Banks would have had to bid up their own 
costs substantially in an attempt to ward off these small aggressive insti- 
tutions. The marginal cost of funds would have been enormous because 
the same rate of interest would have had to be paid on similar deposits. 
Commercial banks would also have implicitly encouraged their custom- 
ers to shift from demand deposits to their own time and savings accounts 
if  they  chose  to  fight-incurring  a  deadweight loss.  However,  as  the 
market shares of  savings and loan  associations increased,  the pool  of 
deposits that banks could win rose in different local markets, and the ex- 
pected cost of incremental deposits attracted through a small rate increase 
declined. When commercial banks chose to retaliate with interest rates, Donald  D.  Hester  149 
Table  1.  Interest Differentials and Commercial Banks' Share of Savings and 
Time Deposits,  1952-68 
Percent  unless otherwise  specified 
Interest rates paid  Rate 
premiums 
Savings  Time and  at savings  Commercial 
accounts  savings deposits  associationsa  banks'  share  of 
at savings  in commercial  (percentage  all over-the- 
Year  associations  banks  points)  counter savings 
1952  2.7  1.2  1.5  46.0 
1953  2.8  1.2  1.6  44.8 
1954  2.9  1.3  1.6  43.4 
1955  2.9  1.4  1.5  41.6 
1956  3.0  1.6  1.4  40.2 
1957  3.3  2.1  1.2  40.5 
1958  3.4  2.2  1.2  40.7 
1959  3.5  2.4  1.1  39.8 
1960  3.9  2.6  1.3  39.1 
1961  3.9  2.7  1.2  39.9 
1962  4.1  3.2  0.9  41.5 
1963  4.2  3.3  0.9  41.7 
1964  4.2  3.4  0.8  42.3 
1965  4.2  3.7  0.5  43.8 
1966  4.5  4.0  0.5  45.0 
1967  4.7  4.2  0.5  46.1 
1968  4.7  4.5  0.2  47.0 
Source: United States League of Savings Associations, '74 Savings and Loan Fact Book (Chicago: USL, 
1974), pp. 15, 17. 
a.  The difference between the interest rates paid on accounts at savings associations and that paid on 
time and savings deposits in commercial banks. 
the nationwide erosion of the market share of commercial banks came to 
an abrupt halt, as is shown in table 1. Between 1956 and 1962 the differ- 
ence in savings deposit yields paid by commercial banks and savings and 
loan associations shrank by more than one-third. 
The decision by commercial banks to meet the competition marked a 
turning point that was soon evident on other fronts, and may have un- 
leashed interest rates whose volatility began to increase. 
NEGOTIABLE  CERTIFICATES  OF  DEPOSIT 
The emergence of negotiable certificates of deposit has a similar back- 
ground. The  volume  of  commercial  paper  outstanding approximately 
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commercial paper were attractive relative to other low-risk, short-term 
assets and partly because credit rationing appeared to threaten the supply 
of credit to large sales-finance firms that had access to that market. Com- 
mercial paper is  a partial alternative to  bank intermediation between 
very large corporations because funds flow directly between corporations; 
it is not a full displacement of banks because it must be backed by bank 
lines of credit in order to have a prime credit rating. Nevertheless,  the 
threat was clear and in February 1961 two large eastern banks, together 
with the Discount  Corporation of  New  York,  established a secondary 
market in large-denomination corporate time certificates of deposit. This 
action constituted a dramatic reversal of  the long-standing policies  of 
many large banks of discouraging and even refusing to accept corporate 
time deposits. It was successful in the sense that the volume of outstand- 
ing certificates of deposit soon exceeded the volume of commercial paper, 
so that the banks' market share of intermediation among large corpora- 
tions was effectively protected. Subsequently banks and their parent hold- 
ing companies borrowed on an unsecured basis from large corporations 
and issued their own bank-related commercial paper. 
There appear to be three principal reasons why negotiable certificates 
of deposit emerged when they did. First, banks made a preemptive move 
to deter a potent rival, commercial paper. Market share was a prime con- 
sideration, as it was in the struggle for consumer deposits. Second, many 
interest rates had reached postwar peaks in late 1959, and the possibility 
that this event would recur could not be excluded. There had always been 
a demand for interest-bearing negotiable assets, and the recent events had 
caused that demand to increase. Finally, the continuing decline in the 
fraction of bank portfolios held in U.S. government securities meant that 
commercial banks'  own  secondary  reserve was  being  depleted.  They 
needed a buffer, and a market that permitted large banks to bid com- 
petitively for medium-term funds was  attractive. It is  noteworthy that 
shortly after the emergence of certificates of deposit, banks began to in- 
crease their holdings of tax exempt securities, which were very high yield- 
ing (after-tax)  assets but never convenient as secondary reserves. 
Individual banks began to issue negotiable certificates of deposit be- 
cause they needed to protect themselves and their customers from epi- 
sodes of excess loan demand and associated surges in interest rates that 
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or ambiguities about regulations. When certificates first appeared, they 
were subject to  the 5 percent reserve requirement that applied to time 
and savings deposits at member banks and the regulation Q ceiling. Dur- 
ing those years the ceiling was routinely raised by the Federal Reserve 
whenever it threatened to become binding. The reserve requirement did 
put certificates at a slight disadvantage relative to commercial paper, but 
those certificates were highly liquid and more divisible than commercial 
paper.  Certificates attracted funds  that  banks  could  lend  for  several 
months. The ability of the banks to forestall deposit withdrawals by large 
depositors was enhanced and the volume of funds available to banks be- 
came more predictable; the innovation was expansionary because increas- 
ing amounts of funds were subsequently funneled into relatively efficient 
intermediaries. 
Restrictive monetary policy was slightly weakened by this innovation 
because banks could respond more flexibly to policy-induced increases in 
interest rates and excess demand for loans by raising the rate at which 
they offered new certificates. A bank needed only to bid up interest rates 
to attract funds and, therefore, it never had to reject valued customers 
through involuntary loan denials. Only a short time passed before the 
Federal  Reserve  performed a  daring experiment:  it  plugged  the  only 
safety valve banks had by freezing the regulation Q ceiling in 1966. 
ONE-BANK  HOLDING  COMPANIES 
The initial response to the apparently unanticipated inflexibility of the 
regulation Q ceiling was to avoid it by having a bank go through a con- 
generic transformation to form a one-bank holding company. This tactic 
allowed banks to raise funds at market interest rates by issuing commer- 
cial paper or by other borrowing that was not subject to ceilings or indeed 
even to monitoring by the Federal Reserve. To be sure, banks did not 
convert the instant the problem  arose; many of  their customers were 
probably denied credit or had their credit rationed, and a number of new 
compensating balance arrangements were introduced. Savings and loan 
associations were even less deft and, therefore, the mortgage and housing 
markets were crippled by disintermediation as the Federal Reserve and 
large government borrowings forced market interest rates upward. 
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not stop when market interest rates fell below  regulation Q ceilings in 
early  1967.  Banks  recognized that the  condition  of  a binding ceiling 
might recur and congeneric conversions were time-consuming. The Fed- 
eral Reserve  vainly  sought  to  have  the  Bank  Holding  Company Act 
amended as it had since 1956. Finally in 1970  Congress did amend the 
act, and the Federal Reserve's regulatory reach was extended to include 
activities of one-bank holding companies.6 The monetary authority did 
manage to impose reserve requirements on debt issued by holding com- 
panies before the act was amended and was partly successful in prevent- 
ing banks from transferring assets  to  their holding-company  affiliates 
when the purpose was to avoid regulation Q ceilings. 
Although one-bank holding companies had existed for many years in 
the United States, they controlled small banks and represented no threat 
to monetary policy. The innovation that occurred in 1966 was to recog- 
nize that large banks could avoid controls through regulation Q ceilings 
by exploiting this legal form. The innovation occurred because market 
interest rates rose above the ceiling, and banks recognized that holding 
companies could avoid both regulation and surveillance. Banks wanted 
the capability to accommodate the loan requests of their good customers. 
The  change was irreversible; congeneric  holding  companies  remained 
after regulation Q ceilings were removed from large certificates of  de- 
posit and they will remain after (if  ever)  regulation Q ceilings are re- 
moved  from consumer deposits under the Depository  Institutions De- 
regulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. 
The  congeneric  conversion  episode  has  been  more  damaging  for 
monetary control than the emergence of certificates of deposit. After the 
regulation Q ceiling was allowed to become binding, a misplaced empha- 
sis on  and confidence in the  ability of  the Federal Reserve  to  control 
aggregates like M2  and M4  developed. The Federal Reserve could ob- 
viously influence these quantities through regulation Q, but it could not 
control the sum of either M2 or M4  and the close substitutes that were 
being issued by nonbank affiliates of holding companies. The monitoring 
ability of the central bank was impaired because holding-company affili- 
ates that were not banks did not (and do not)  report their activities in a 
timely fashion.  Consequently, the belated  attempts by the Federal Re- 
6.  Before the  1970 amendments the Federal Reserve had no  supervisory au- 
thority over a bank holding company unless it had 25 percent or more of the stock 
of at least two commercial banks. Donald D. Hester  153 
serve to impose reserve requirements on bank-related paper were trans- 
parently stopgap measures. 
Even though the Bank Holding Company Act was amended, the epi- 
sode has seriously damaged the Federal Reserve's credibility. It has estab- 
lished an impression that holding companies could do what they could get 
away with and, therefore, has forced the monetary authority into the un- 
enviable position of having to be the final arbiter of an endless series of 
seemingly plausible schemes. Whatever is approved will never be sensibly 
depicted in a macroeconomic model unless committee decisionmaking by 
the Federal Reserve Board achieves an unprecedented degree of transi- 
tivity. Further, the fragility of the financial system has been increasing 
because the leverage in bank holding companies-the  ratio of  debt to 
equity-is  higher than it is in the banks they control. The Federal Reserve 
is not likely to act aggressively if such actions endanger the solvency of 
large financial institutions. 
EUROBRANCHES  AND  FOREIGN  BANKING 
In addition to congeneric transformations, in  1966  and increasingly 
thereafter many large commercial banks in the  United States established 
branches offshore. With the exception of overnight deposits held in Carib- 
bean branches, deposits in foreign branches of U.S. banks are excluded 
from monetary aggregates that the Federal Reserve publishes. Deposits 
in foreign branches tend to be very short-term time deposits, which earn 
interest at a rate that is determined daily in London. Because branches 
are viewed as operating under the banking laws of the country in which 
they are located, their deposits are exempt from U.S. reserve requirements 
and regulation Q. An overseas branch may exist physically in some for- 
eign country or simply be a "shell" that exists in the computer at the head 
office of a large U.S. bank. At the end of 1965 there were 211  overseas 
branches of U.S. commercial banks that belonged to the Federal Reserve 
System; 177 of these were branches of one bank, the First National City 
Bank  of  New  York.  The  number of  overseas member bank branches 
rose to 244 at the end of 1966, 295 at the end of 1967, and 375 at the end 
of 1968. By the end of 1972,  107 member banks were operating 627 for- 
eign branches. The assets of overseas member bank branches increased 
eightfold during the seven-year period and exceeded  10 percent of the 
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national counterpart of the one-bank holding company episode.7 There 
was no correspondingly large increase in gross capital expenditures by 
foreign affiliates of U.S. firms or in the sum of U.S. imports and exports. 
Large banks borrowed extensively in the Eurodollar market whenever 
the regulation Q ceiling on certificates of deposit was binding during the 
late  1960s.  In  1969  the Federal Reserve imposed  10 percent marginal 
reserve requirements on Eurodollar borrowings and issued the "Martin 
letter," a letter from Chairman William McChesney Martin, Jr., to mem- 
ber banks, which asked that activities of offshore branches be confined to 
developing new international business and not be used for shifting de- 
posits away from domestic reserve requirements or otherwise avoiding 
domestic monetary control. Eurodollar borrowings by  domestic banks 
fell immediately after these actions and, perhaps in a spirit of compro- 
mise, the Federal Reserve eliminated its regulation Q ceiling for short- 
term certificates of  deposit. However,  the number of  U.S.  banks with 
foreign branches, the number of foreign branches, and the total assets at 
foreign branches of U.S.  banks have risen rapidly in subsequent years. 
There have been further large fluctuations in Eurodollar borrowings by 
domestic banks, continuing changes in reserve requirements on  Euro- 
dollar borrowings, and a letter to banks from Chairman Arthur F. Burns, 
which reemphasized the position previously taken by Chairman Martin. 
Moreover, there is reason to believe that lending by offshore branches to 
foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations has consequences for U.S. policy; 
funds are surely fungible among branches of  a multinational bank or 
subsidiaries of a nonfinancial corporation. 
A  further reverberation from this explosion  involved foreign banks, 
which apparently were responding to the international expansion of U.S. 
banks. Most deposits in U.S. chartered subsidiaries of foreign banks are 
included in U.S.  monetary aggregates. Until  the passage of  the  Inter- 
national  Banking Act  in  1978,  deposits  of  branches  and  agencies  of 
foreign banks were excluded from aggregates. Between  1972  and 1979 
the number of offices of foreign banks tripled in the United States, and 
7.  See also the discussion in Donald D. Hester, "The Effects of Eurodollar and 
Domestic Money Market Innovations on the Interpretation  and Control of Mone- 
tary Aggregates,"  SSRI Workshop Series 8005 (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
Social Systems Research Institute,  April 1980), in Raymond E. Lombra and Willard 
E.  Witte,  eds.,  The  Political  Economy  of  Domestic  and  International  Monetary 
Relations (Iowa State University Press, forthcoming). Donald D. Hester  155 
the assets of these offices sextupled. At the end of 1979 only about one- 
fifth of their $168 billion in assets was backed by nonbank U.S. domestic 
deposits, yet these banks held 40  percent of commercial and industrial 
loans that were in portfolios of commercial banks in New York and Cali- 
fornia. The loans of these foreign banks were largely financed by borrow- 
ing from Europe.  Until  the passage of  the International Banking Act, 
this substantial volume of intermediation by foreign banks was not closely 
monitored and certainly was not picked up in large macro models of the 
economy. 
Foreign branches of U.S. banks and U.S. branches of foreign banks 
existed before 1966, but events in that year hastened their development 
and probably permanently altered the nature of their activities. As in the 
case of bank holding companies, the factors leading to these innovations 
were high and volatile  interest rates that rose above the  regulation Q 
ceiling,  avoidance  of  regulations  involving  reserve  requirements and 
interest rate ceilings, and avoidance of surveillance by monetary authori- 
ties. However, the weighting of these factors was probably different. In 
particular, it is awkward for the Federal Reserve to attempt to monitor 
activities of foreign branches of U.S.  banks; such probing could easily 
appear to be a violation of the sovereignty of another country. In addi- 
tion,  advances in data processing were undoubtedly important for co- 
ordinating multinational banking networks. The  Clearing House  Inter- 
bank  Payments  System,  which  is  an  automated mechanism  critically 
involved in Eurodollar transactions, was activated in 1970. 
The International Banking Act  could not really address the growing 
difficulty of controlling domestic economic  activity. International bank- 
ing is a complex  scene  in which corporations and banks seem able to 
exploit the regulations (or  lack thereof)  of  one country to get around 
those of another country. Ambiguities in the domains of surveillance by 
different central banks  and governments  are common.  The  effects  of 
monetary policy actions have become less predictable as banks and non- 
financial corporations increasingly exploit these ambiguities. 
REPURCHASE  AGREEMENTS  AND  NET 
FEDERAL  FUNDS  PURCHASED 
Repurchase agreements are transactions in which a bank or security 
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individual for a short period and simultaneously commits itself  to  re- 
acquire these securities at an agreed price. These arrangements  were de- 
veloped by nonbank security dealers at about the time of the "accord" as 
an inexpensive mechanism for financing their inventories. The Federal 
Reserve first reported using them for Treasury securities in 1950 and for 
agency securities in 1967. In late 1968 commercial banks were again sub- 
ject to binding regulation Q ceilings for certificates of deposit. On this 
occasion  a  number of  large banks began  to  emulate  dealers  and the 
Federal Reserve by arranging short-term repurchase agreements in large 
denominations to reduce their reserves obligation, since funds borrowed 
through repurchase agreements had no reserve requirements. (Funds ac- 
quired through repurchase agreements are not subject to interest rate ceil- 
ings.)  Initially banks were using many different kinds of  assets as col- 
lateral for repurchase agreements, but in mid-1969  the Federal Reserve 
clarified its regulation D  to state that only borrowed funds secured by 
Treasury and agency securities would be exempt from reserve require- 
ments. 
From the perspective of a firm or state government accepting securities 
in an overnight repurchase agreement, this innovation was a boon-its 
demand-deposit balance was reduced at the close of a business -day  and 
was restored at the beginning of the following day. Consequently, access 
to deposit funds was not diminished and interest was earned at a rate that 
was slightly lower than the federal funds rate. In actuality, although not in 
law, interest was being paid on demand deposits. When interest rates fell 
in  1970,  banks largely withdrew from the business of  arranging repur- 
chase agreements. However, record high interest rates in 1973 and 1974 
and competition from securities dealers again led banks to acquire large 
volumes of funds through repurchase agreements; and, at about that time, 
estimated money-demand functions  began  to  disintegrate.8 Since  then 
repurchase agreements have been prominent in money markets. 
In addition to borrowing funds through repurchase agreements, mem- 
ber banks began to borrow federal funds on an unsecured basis from a 
large number of other financial institutions and government agencies dur- 
ing 1968 and 1969.  The amounts of federal funds acquired by member 
banks cannot be distinguished from funds obtained through repurchase 
agreements in publicly available data. On the basis of two cross-section 
8. See Stephen M. Goldfeld, "The Case of the Missing Money," BPEA, 3:1976, 
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surveys of forty-six large banks in 1974 and 1977, federal funds borrow- 
ing from other than member banks appeared to be of the same magnitude 
as the volume  of  repurchase agreements.9 Bank  call  reports began to 
include information on the sum of net federal funds purchased by com- 
mercial banks and net funds acquired through repurchase agreements 
(hereafter net purchased funds)  during the  1960s.  For all commercial 
banks this quantity was, at year-end, $0.3 billion in 1965,  $3.2 billion in 
1970,  and $19.7  billion in 1975. The amount was $52.1  billion in June 
1978, when the call report was modified, making the continuation of this 
series impossible. 
The origins of short-term net purchases of federal funds by banks are 
unclear. Several legal opinions by the Federal Reserve  and the comp- 
troller of the currency were required to legitimize this practice, and much 
testing of  regulatory waters by banks, other financial institutions, and 
government agencies occurred before an interpretation was published in 
the January 1970 Federal Reserve Bulletin that clarified what constituted 
federal fund transactions.10  These regulatory changes were an essential 
element leading to the evolution of net purchased funds.1' 
The rapid growth of net purchased funds appears to have been stimu- 
lated primarily by high short-term interest rates that emerged in  1969, 
1973,  and  1974.  Competitive  pressures from  securities  dealers,  very 
aggressive corporate treasurers and managers of  government agencies, 
and a shortage of deposit funds forced banks to purchase federal funds 
from firms and governments that had previously held bank deposits. When 
interest rates fell in  1970,  banks briefly were able to reduce their pur- 
chases, so in the early stages this change in practice was reversible. A 
9.  Wayne J.  Smith, "Repurchase Agreements and  Federal Funds," Federal 
Reserve  Bulletin,  vol.  64  (May  1978),  pp.  3 53-60. 
10. "Interpretation  of Regulation Q," Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 56 (January 
1970),pp. 38-39. 
11. A summary  of this sequence of legal opinions appears  in Hester, "Effects  of 
Eurodollar and Domestic Money Market Innovations." The  1970 interpretation 
provided  the conditions  under which federal funds borrowing  would be exempt from 
regulations D and Q and required that the notion of  a bank be redefined.  A bank 
was defined to include member commercial banks, nonmember commercial banks, 
Edge Act  and Agreement corporations, branches and agencies of  foreign banks, 
savings banks,  building  or savings and loan associations,  and cooperative  banks.  Also 
exempt from the regulations  were purchases and sales by the Export-Import  Bank, 
the Minbanc Capital Corporation, federal agencies, and nonbank security dealers. 
In 1979 the definition  was extended to include credit unions. 158  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
small decline also occurred after the peak of interest rates in 1974, but 
this time banks were not successful in eliminating the practice of buying 
short-term funds  from  corporations  and  governments.  It  appears  as 
though the practice is a permanent change and thus qualifies as an inno- 
vation. 
Table  2  presents measures of  financial market activity  that  reflect 
growth in  net  purchased funds  since  1970,  including demand-deposit 
turnover. This  measure is  the ratio of  demand-deposit  account  debits 
(expressed at an annual rate) to demand deposits, excluding U.S. govern- 
ment and interbank accounts. Over the postwar period, demand-deposit 
turnover has been showing an upward trend. The turnover rate rose from 
17.6 times per year in 1945 to 47.7 in 1964 when the series was revised- 
an annual rate of growth of about 5.4 percent; between 1964 and 1970 a 
comparable measure grew 8.5 percent annually. The turnover shown in 
table 2 grew 11.6 percent a year from June 1970 to June 1977 and 14.6 
percent a year between June 1977  and June 1980.  Part of the upward 
trend in turnover can be explained by rising interest rates; but that can 
be only a small part of the explanation because rates were lower in 1977 
than they were in 1969. Another part of the explanation comes from the 
growth in repurchase agreements. Deposit  accounts of corporations and 
state and local governments must be debited in order for them to partici- 
pate in a repurchase agreement. The annualized volumes of debits used 
in calculating the reported turnover rates rose from $10 trillion in 1970 
to $62 trillion in 1980. A substantial fraction of this increase is probably 
attributable to the increasing volume of repurchase agreements. For ex- 
ample, if  the  outstanding volume  of  overnight repurchase agreements 
were $40 billion, they alone would imply an annualized volume of debits 
over 250 business days of $10 trillion. In table 2 very large increases in 
deposit turnover occurred between December 1972 and December 1974 
when the reported net purchased funds approximately doubled.12  A simi- 
larly large increase in turnover occurred between December  1975  and 
June  1977,  when  net  purchased funds  again  approximately doubled. 
Judging from the substantial increase in deposit turnover between De- 
12. Call report information,  because it pertains  to a single day, is extraordinarily 
vulnerable  to "window  dressing."  It is a serious defect of almost all published infor- 
mation about repurchase agreements that  it  is  based upon  single-day figures- 
usually Wednesdays.  The volume of repurchase  agreements  on Wednesdays  is likely 
to be much smaller than on weekends when three days' funds can be acquired for a 
single day's  brokerage  charges. Donald D. Hester  159 
Table 2.  Measures of Financial Activity in Money Markets,  1970-80a 
Chaniges  in 
system  open- 
Number  offunds transfers  market 
Year  Net purchased  Demand-  account 
and  funds (billions deposit  turn-  Wire  Check  (billions  of 
month  of dollars)  over  (ratio)  (millions)  (billions)  dollars) 
1970:June  4.5  73.1  7  7.2  0.6 
December  3.2  77.0  0.7 
1971:June  5.6  80.4  0.9 
December  6.9  83.7  8  7.7  1.0 
1972:June  11.6  84.8  9  8.5  1.2 
December  9.5  90.7  0.5 
1973:June  16.8  99.9  12  10.0  1.4 
December  19.0  110.2  11001.4 
1974:June  25.5  116.9  15  10.8  1.0 
December  18.5  128.0  1  1.8 
1975:June  22.4  124.4  17  11.4  2.2 
December  19.7  131.0  1  2.6 
1976:June  29.8  139.3  21  12.3  1.9 
December  32.6  153.5  2  3.8 
1977:June  41.7  157.7b  3.4 
133.6b  25  13.3 
December  41.2  129.2  5.5 
1978:June  52.1  144.4  29  14.1  3.9 
December  n.a.  139.3  2  2.5 
1979:June  n.a.  167.3  3  515.3 
December  n.a.  172.4  15.1  2.3 
1980:June  n.a.  201.5  2.3 
December  n.a.  222.7  n.a.  n.a.  1.4 
Sources: Net purchased  funds, demand-deposit turnover, and changes in system open-market account- 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues; funds transfers-Board  of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve 
System,  66th  Anniual Report,  1979,  p.  323  and  preceding  issues. 
n.a.  Not available. 
a.  Net purchased funds are the sum of federal funds purchased and funds acquired through repurchase 
agreements minus funds sold to commercial banks as reported on call reports by all commercial banks. 
Demand-deposit turnover is the ratio of demand-deposit account debits to demand deposits at selected 
clearinghouses or banks, excluding interbank and U.S.  government debits and accounts. The series was 
substantially revised in June 1977; the reported rate is for the indicated month but is  annualized. The 
data for funds transfers are numbers of items processed by the Federal Reserve System in the calendar 
year ending in December. The amount of funds transferred  by wire is many times the amount transferred 
by check. Changes in the system open-market account reflect the mean absolute value of end-of-month 
changes in  the Federal Reserve System's open-market account,  measured over the six months ending 
with the month shown. 
b. The first entry for June 1977 shows turnover calculated on the old basis; the second entry is calcu- 
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cember 1978 and December 1980, it is likely that repurchase agreements 
again surged during that two-year period. 
In order to  deal  in  repurchase agreements, banks must be  able  to 
transfer funds expeditiously. Wire transfers can be completed in a few 
minutes while check transfers require one  or more business days. The 
third and fourth columns in table 2 report the numbers of items trans- 
ferred by  wire  and  check  through the  Federal  Reserve  for  calendar 
years.'3 The growth rate in the number of wire transfers was particularly 
high in 1973  and 1974,  when the volume of repurchase agreements ap- 
pears to have risen. Since the end of 1975, funds transferred  by wire have 
again been growing at a rate of about 20 percent a year, which suggests 
that repurchase agreements and similarly designed transfers involving 
Eurodollars-are rising rapidly. The number of checks cleared through the 
Federal Reserve System has been growing less rapidly than wire transfers. 
The annual growth rate in the number of checks cleared by the system 
peaked in 1973 and has been about 7 percent in recent years. 
As the private sector became more adept at moving funds, the Federal 
Reserve found itself increasingly having to intervene in the open market. 
Sizable increases in its portfolio were followed by substantial liquidations. 
The last column of table 2 roughly summarizes this activity by reporting 
over six-month intervals the mean absolute value of monthly changes of 
securities in the open market account. Between 1970 and June 1979 this 
measure increased ninefold-much  faster than any of the major mone- 
tary aggregates. The Federal Reserve was especially active in the market 
between June 1976 and June 1979 when deposit turnover, net purchased 
funds, and wire transfers were rapidly expanding. An obvious interpreta- 
tion is that the underlying innovations were impairing the Federal Re- 
serve's ability to control monetary aggregates such as Ml  and M2. The 
amount of trading activity declined about 40 percent in the last eighteen 
months shown in the table relative to the preceding three years.14 This 
13. The growth in wire transfers was greatly facilitated by the establishment  of 
the Culpeper,  Virginia, "switch"  and related computer facilities in 1971 that sharply 
reduced costs of wiring funds and securities in the United States. 
14. The  number of  trading interventions also  fell  by  about one-third in  the 
period beginning October 6, 1979, from the level of the previous year. See Fred J. 
Levin and Paul Meek, "Implementing  the New Operating Procedures: The View 
from  the  Trading  Desk,"  in  New  Monetary  Control  Procedures,  Federal  Reserve 
Staff Study (Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, 1981),  vol.  1, 
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apparently reflects the Board's decision to allow wider swings in interest 
rates, which was announced in October 1979. 
The Federal Reserve does not seem to have appreciated the importance 
for monetary control of the development of repurchase agreements and 
net purchased funds. As is argued in the final section of this paper, over- 
night repurchase agreements are a transactions medium in every conven- 
tional sense, but are not included in transactions aggregates such as MiA 
and MlB.  This lapse and its perception by banks and others were impor- 
tant contributors to the growth of net purchased funds. The amount of 
federal funds supplied to banks by government agencies and others does 
not appear to be closely monitored by the Federal Reserve, and informa- 
tion about repurchase agreements is in woefully short supply. Surveillance 
is very limited, a fact that fundamentally impedes efforts to control mone- 
tary aggregates. Belated recognition of the Federal Reserve's regulatory 
lapse may have been indicated by  its October  1979  decision  to  place 
marginal reserve requirements on  net  purchased  funds,  although  the 
requirements were abandoned in the summer of 1980. 
MONEY-MARKET  MUTUAL  FUNDS 
Households  and individuals were not able to participate in the game 
of earning interest on transactions balances through overnight repurchase 
agreements because  denominations of  these  arranged transactions are 
frequently very large. An "even lot" may be as high as $25 million. Dur- 
ing  1972  a new  class  of  mutual funds,  money-market mutual  funds, 
emerged whose  function was to  collect  household  deposits in sums as 
small as $1,000  and invest the proceeds in large-denomination short-term 
money-market instruments, Treasury bills,  commercial paper, and ne- 
gotiable certificates of deposit. Assets  of funds rose until interest rates 
peaked in  1974,  when they were a little less than $4  billion.  Between 
1974  and 1977  assets barely grew, although the number of funds con- 
tinued to increase. Since early 1978 assets of these funds and the number 
of funds have grown very rapidly; total assets exceeded  $100  billion in 
March 1981.  Balances  in the funds are typically withdrawable on  de- 
mand in amounts as small as $500 by check or wire. Thus money-market 
funds provide services to individuals that are very similar to those pro- 
vided by commercial bank demand deposits, by effectively increasing the 
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to  acquire a broadly diversified portfolio  of  indivisible money-market 
instruments. 
Money-market funds emerged because  of  the  growing gap between 
short-term  money-market  interest  rates  and  regulatory  ceilings  that 
existed at depository institutions on demand, savings, and time accounts. 
Their development was also facilitated by improvements in wire transfer 
services. Their principal social contribution is to destroy the effectiveness 
of regulatory ceilings; they draw funds away from low interest bank ac- 
counts and lend the same funds back to banks and others at high interest 
rates. They are modern-day Robin Hoods who protect the public from a 
coalition of government and depository institution barons; as in the days 
of old, they increase social welfare by taking risks. The risks do not ap- 
pear to be very great. Although there is no protection corresponding to 
deposit insurance, monetary authorities seem reluctant to allow a major 
bank to default on its certificates of deposit. 
The importance of this large expansion of money-market mutual funds 
is unclear. They are included in monetary aggregates such as M2. If the 
sources of  funds are household  savings and demand-deposit accounts, 
the meaning of monetary aggregates that include such deposits is being 
preserved. If,  on  the other hand, the  sources  are other money-market 
instruments, their rapid growth may disrupt monetary control. It is puz- 
zling that they should grow so rapidly if they are not, in fact, substan- 
tively distorting flows of funds in the money market. 
OFF-BUDGET  AGENCIES  AND  FEDERALLY 
GUARANTEED  LOANS 
A  major  change  in  U.S.  financial markets was  brought  about  by 
Congress and the Johnson and Nixon  administrations when they greatly 
expanded the volume of off-budget credit activity.15 Briefly stated, govern- 
ment-sponsored agencies intervene in the capital market to increase the 
flows or reduce the costs of credit to certain specified sectors of the econ- 
omy, especially agriculture and housing. They operate by making direct 
15. A  complete analysis of  federal credit programs, both on-budget and off- 
budget, is beyond the scope of this paper. A convenient summary of programs is 
available  in the  annual  volume,  Special  Analyses,  Budget  of  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment,  Fiscal  Year  1982,  Special  Analysis  F,  pp.  141-201. Donald D. Hester  163 
loans, guaranteeing or cosigning loans that have been made in the pri- 
vate sector, and providing secondary market facilities that make some 
assets of the private sector more convenient to market or hold. Examples 
include  the  Federal  National  Mortgage  Association,  the  Farm  Credit 
Banks, and the Student Loan Marketing Association. Sponsored agencies 
issue debt to finance the loans they make; the volume  of this debt has 
quintupled in the past decade. While agencies have existed for many years, 
most  of  the  outstanding  debt has  been  issued  by  agencies  that  were 
created between 1968 and 1972. 
Off-budget federally guaranteed loan programs have about quadrupled 
in the past decade. Both sponsored agencies and loan guarantee programs 
provide intermediation services to the public because they modify finan- 
cial contracts in ways that encourage capital formation and retention. 
The targets of agencies and guarantee programs are determined by Con- 
gress, rather than by the market. 
The emergence of many sponsored agencies and guarantee programs 
in the 1968-72  period appears to reflect several factors: a desire by the 
government to conceal  large budget deficits by privatizing what would 
otherwise have been included in the federal deficit; strong pressures from 
the housing industry and thrift institutions, which were particularly crip- 
pled in the crunch of  1966;  and political expediency, which occurs be- 
cause government guarantee programs are not required to show their ex- 
pected losses  until realization. Large deficits, a controversial war, and 
herding instincts induced the government to introduce these programs in 
a relatively short period. By 1981 the volume of credit outstanding that 
was supported by  sponsored  agencies  and all guarantee programs ex- 
ceeded the assets of  savings and loan  associations, the nation's second 
largest financial intermediary. 
The primary force leading to the establishment of sponsored agency 
and guarantee programs was almost surely the disintermediation experi- 
enced in 1966 by thrift institutions, which in turn was caused by an inflex- 
ible deposit rate ceiling and rapidly rising money-market interest rates. 
Both programs are tautologically a consequence of regulatory changes. 
Both also seem designed to exploit ambiguities in fiscal surveillance by 
the public by perverting the budgetary review process. The establishment 
of sponsored agencies is analogous to a private corporation's spinning off 
a subsidiary; the balance sheet of the parent firm no longer accurately 
reflects the combined position of the parent and subsidiary. Guarantee 164  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
Table 3.  Residential Mortgage Debt, by Type of Holder,  1972-80a 
Billions of dollars unless otherwise specified 
Federal 
Federal  share  of 
share  of  annual 
Federal  and  Major  outstanding  change  in 
related  financial  All  debt  debt 
agencies  institutionzs  others  Total  (percent)  (percent) 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1972  41.5  346.1  66.5  454.1  9.1  22.Ob 
1973  49.4  384.8  75.1  509.3  9.7  14.3 
1974  63.9  407.9  77.6  549.4  11.6  36.2 
1975  79.7  433.3  78.4  591.4  13.5  37.6 
1976  91.8  486.1  83.1  661.0  13.9  17.4 
1977  111.7  564.0  92.7  768.4  14.5  18.5 
1978  137.6  643.8  104.1  885.4  15.5  22.1 
1979  175.4  710.0  119.7  1,005.1  17.5  31.6 
1980  206.4  750.7  137.2  1,094.3  18.9  34.8 
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. 
a.  The debt by federal and related agencies includes mortgage pools or trusts. Major financial institu- 
,tions include commercial and mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations,  and  life  insurance 
companies. Column 5 is column 1 divided by column 4. Column 6 is the first difference of column I di- 
vided by the first difference  of column 4. All data refer to end of year shown. 
b. Constructed using earlier unrevised data. 
programs are misleadingly represented in the federal budget because of 
the dubious underwriting procedure mentioned above. 
The consequences of federal credit programs have been to reduce the 
shares of credit to the agricultural and real estate sectors that are held by 
banks and thrift institutions and to reduce borrowing costs of these sec- 
tors. Table 3 indicates a steadily rising share of mortgage lending that is 
held or assisted by federal agencies, particularly in years when interest 
rates are high, such as 1974,  1979,  and 1980. Table 4 indicates that the 
differential between the Federal Home Loan Bank Board effective mort- 
gage loan interest rate and the rate on Moody's Aaa corporate bonds has 
narrowed in response to federal credit programs. The differential between 
the mortgage rate and the  rate on  Baa  bonds  has  shifted from being 
strongly positive to being predominantly negative, especially in years like 
1974,  1975, and 1980. 
Because these programs have increasingly shielded housing and agri- 
culture from rising interest rates, they have blunted one  of the cutting 
edges of restrictive monetary policy and redistributed the burden of re- 
strictive policy to other sectors. Larger increases in interest rates will be Donald  D.  Hester  165 
Table 4.  Interest Rates on Mortgage Loans and Corporate Bonds, 1963-80 
Percent unless otherwise specified 
Federal Home 
Loan Bank  Mortgage  Mortgage 
Moody's  Board  premiumb  Moody's  premiumc 
corporate  effective  (percentage  corporate  (percentage 
Yeara  Aaa  mortgage rate  points)  Baa  points) 
1963  4.35  5.89  1.54  4.85  1.04 
1964  4.44  5.84  1.40  4.81  1.03 
1965  4.68  5.85  1.17  5.02  0.83 
1966  5.39  6.58  1.19  6.18  0.40 
1967  6.19  6.54  0.35  6.93  -0.39 
1968  6.45  7.23  0.78  7.23  0.00 
1969  7.72  8.25  0.53  8.65  -0.40 
1970  7.64  8.38  0.74  9.12  -0.74 
1971  7.25  7.77  0.52  8.38  -0.61 
1972  7.08  7.66  0.58  7.93  -0.27 
1973  7.68  8.49  0.81  8.48  0.01 
1974  8.89  9.37  0.48  10.55  -1.18 
1975  8.79  9.01  0.22  10.35  -1.34 
1976  7.98  9.10  1.12  9.12  -0.02 
1977  8.19  9.09  0.90  8.99  0.10 
1978  9.16  10.02  0.86  9.94  0.08 
1979  10.74  11.64  0.90  12.06  -0.42 
1980  13.21  13.26  0.05  15.14  -1.88 
Source: Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  various issues. 
a.  Average rate in December. 
b. The difference between the Federal Home Loan Bank Board effective rate and Moody's corporate 
Aaa rate. 
c.  The difference between the Federal Home Loan Bank Board effective rate and Moody's corporate 
Baa rate. 
required to obtain the same restrictive effect because major credit pro- 
grams automatically expand to protect their target sectors. 
FUTURES  MARKETS  IN  FINANCIAL  INSTRUMENTS 
Futures markets in  financial instruments first appeared in  October 
1975 when the Chicago Board of Trade opened a facility for trading col- 
lateral depository receipts for Government National Mortgage Associa- 
tion  (GNMA)  securities. Subsequently markets have been  introduced 
for Treasury bills, notes, and bonds; GNMA certificates; and commercial 
paper. In mid-January 1981,  the Wall Street Journal reported that the 
volume of open contracts in Treasury bills, Treasury bonds, and GNMA 
certificates  was close to $80 billion. 166  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
Superficially, financial futures markets appear to be a very modest ex- 
tension of investment opportunities that are already available in securities 
markets through forward transactions. It has  always been  possible  to 
make transactions that imply a specific forward interest rate by assuming 
a long-term and short-term position in government securities. The contri- 
bution made by the establishment of futures markets is that bets about 
interest rates on selected deliverable assets can be made more inexpen- 
sively than through forward transactions. 
Viewed  from another perspective, futures markets allow the making 
of bets about some interest rate to be decoupled from taking positions in 
assets and thereby tying up capital. This decoupling is useful to investors 
because  securities have multiple  attributes and  are not  solely  used  to 
place  bets  about interest rates. For  example,  commercial banks  hold 
securities to satisfy collateral requirements against government deposits 
and to meet reserve requirements in the cases of some nonmember banks. 
Corporations hold securities in part so that they will have collateral for 
use in reverse repurchase agreements when short-term cash requirements 
arise. Individuals,  until  recently, have  used  futures markets and U.S. 
government securities to transfer taxable income across tax years. 
The introduction of futures contracts also reduced the costs of individ- 
uals desiring to hedge  against fluctuations in interest rates. This hedg- 
ing function is socially useful even when futures markets are inaccurate 
in "discovering" future spot rates because risks are reduced for individ- 
uals who have imperfectly synchronized cash flows. 
The obvious major reason for establishing a market in financial futures 
was the extraordinary volatility of interest rates that occurred in  1973 
and 1974. Corporations and dealers needed to be able to hedge cheaply. 
Futures markets in commodities had been successful in providing oppor- 
tunities to hedge and were easily imitated. As time passed, the number of 
financial  instruments for  which  futures  contracts  were  available  ex- 
panded. Each additional market afforded new opportunities to bet about 
interest rates, but the marginal contribution of an additional market must 
have declined. Those who hedge can use futures markets for one instru- 
ment to ensure their position in another (cross-hedging).  The gain from 
a new futures market is only the additional risk reduction or speculation 
that can be accomplished after all available opportunities to cross-hedge 
or speculate have been exploited. 
Because of the short existence of financial futures markets, little re- Donald D. Hester  167 
liable information is available about how they are affecting the economy. 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that futures markets facilitate wealth holding 
and improve the  allocation  of  investment flows by  providing hedging 
opportunities that diminish risk exposure. They are not unambiguously 
expansionary, however, because they may attract speculators from high- 
risk, high-return investment projects. They pose problems for examiners 
of financial institutions because a speculative position could jeopardize 
an institution's solvency.  Commercial banks do not appear to be espe- 
cially active in the markets, but some conspicuous failures of thrift institu- 
tions have occurred because of speculative positions in GNMA futures.'6 
Futures markets are also likely to affect the effectiveness of monetary 
policy,  since  a firm contemplating an investment project  can  use  the 
futures market to  hedge  against policy-induced  fluctuations in interest 
rates. For example, if interest rates rise in response to a restrictive policy, 
the hedged firm has the option of carrying out the project at the lower 
interest rate that is implicit in its futures position.  In imperfectly com- 
petitive capital markets, it is likely that hedging will lead to higher rates 
of investment at any interest rate. Higher interest rates will be required 
for monetary authorities to achieve a given restrictive effect. Discretion- 
ary policy shocks will fall heavily upon individuals who have not had the 
ability or foresight to hedge. 
SUMMARY 
These seven innovations do not exhaust the set of changes in financial 
markets, but in my view they are its most important elements. Collectively 
they opened  new flows in and improved the efficiency of  both  money 
markets and capital markets by allowing savers and investors to have a 
greater opportunity to lend and borrow at a rate close to the real rate of 
interest. The innovations reduced distortions that arose from interest rate 
ceilings, reserve requirements, and other regulations. 
The innovations came in two waves,  1966-69  and 1973-75;  another 
may have commenced in  1980.  It is clear that the tightening noose  of 
regulation Q  ceilings  led  directly  to  bank  holding  companies,  Euro- 
branches, and a brief flirtation with repurchase agreements, and indirectly 
16. See Marcelle Arak and Christopher J. McCurdy, "Interest Rate Futures," 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  Quarterly  Review,  vol.  4  (Winter  1979-80), 
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to the expansion of off-budget agencies. High interest rates in 1973  and 
1974  permanently established repurchase agreements, accelerated both 
Eurobranch expansion and the invasion of foreign banks, and fostered 
the development of money-market mutual funds. The growing volatility 
of  interest rates surely encouraged the  growth of  financial instrument 
futures markets. 
In the simple example in the first part of this paper, a high nominal 
loan interest rate led to an innovation. Since 1960 distortions in the struc- 
ture of interest rates appear to have been the instigators. As in the ex- 
ample, the values of income multipliers of monetary policy instruments 
are likely to have been affected by innovations. Certificates of deposit, 
net purchased funds, Eurobranch deposits, and claims on money-market 
mutual funds are close substitutes for conventional monetary aggregates 
such as Ml.  With so many new close substitutes, these monetary aggre- 
gates should have become increasingly unreliable guides for the design of 
policy.  The  introduction of  bank holding  companies,  financial instru- 
ment futures markets, and government credit programs have also changed 
financial markets in a variety of  ways. They  are harder to  interpret in 
terms of monetary aggregates but likely to prove no less disruptive to the 
conduct of monetary policy. 
Monetary Policy When Innovation Is Possible 
A monetary authority has a large number of policy instruments at its 
disposal when attempting to achieve its goals. Thus regulations, the dis- 
count rate, and open market transactions can be directed toward targets 
for employment, investment, and the price level. Recent financial market 
innovations potentially affect all the linkages between policy instruments 
and such goals, but it is not feasible to examine how the innovations just 
described have altered the large number of existing linkages. Instead, the 
remaining pages examine how the relation between open market opera- 
tions and nominal national income has been changed. To keep the story 
simple, it is assumed that an open market sale reduces both real income 
and the price deflator, but by  amounts and timing that  depend  upon 
which innovations have occurred. 
The discussion is presented in four parts, which consider the problem 
of recognizing when an innovation has occurred, how innovations have Donald D. Hester  169 
altered the role of  interest rates as guides to  policy,  how  innovations 
have changed the role of monetary aggregates as guides to policy  and, 
finally, how deregulation and the increasing fragility of financial institu- 
tions are likely to modify policies. The discussion does not lead to a policy 
prescription that suggests authorities should peg some aggregate's growth 
rate or any particular interest rate. The structure of financial markets is 
changing and is too fluid for such inflexibility. However, it is argued that 
monetary authorities would  be  remiss if  they  allowed  expected  "real" 
interest rates to be perceived as negative. 
The number of real interest rates in the market is the product of the 
number of price indexes and the number of nominal interest rates that are 
acknowledged to exist. In the following discussion it is assumed that the 
implicit price deflator is the appropriate price index. A strong case can be 
made for selecting the federal funds rate as the appropriate interest rate 
to use when calculating real interest rates. The federal funds rate is the 
price that banks and others are willing to pay for an additional dollar of 
outside, or fiat, money. 
There are a number of serious technical problems with attempting to 
measure what the expected real federal funds rate is on any date. The fact 
that the federal funds rate is an overnight rate is not one of them, how- 
ever, since anyone can construct an average of overnight rates for some 
arbitrary  time interval. In this paper the average is taken over months or 
years. 
THE  LAG  IN  RECOGNIZING  INNOVATION 
For a number of reasons neither the Federal Reserve nor private ob- 
servers were in a position to appreciate the importance of recent innova- 
tions when they occurred. First, reporting forms that banks and others 
submit are not designed to reveal innovation. New instruments appearing 
in bank portfolios  are arbitrarily assigned to  catchall categories on re- 
porting form balance sheets such as other loans, other assets, other de- 
posits and other borrowings, or are carried on the books of subsidiaries, 
which do not need to be reported. 
Second, innovations grow from small seeds; in their early stages they 
were not very different from a number of other odd transactions in which 
banks engage. As they are adopted and imitated, innovations probably 
tend to alter observed relations between macroeconomic variables in the 170  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1981 
highly  nonlinear  manner  suggested  in the diagram  below. The diffusion 
of an innovation  through  an industry  might  reasonably  be approximated 
by a logistic  function  that  applies  to the slope  of some  behavioral  relation. 
If so, marginal  relations  are likely to be especially  misleading  during  the 
period  of maximum  diffusion.'7 
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Third,  innovating  financial  institutions  are operating  in new territory 
in which  regulations  are absent  or at least unclear.  Such  institutions  have 
no interest  in drawing  the attention  of regulators  and are not likely to 
volunteer  information  about  changing  practices.  At any  time,  many  finan- 
cial "technologies"  are being used in the economy;  they all cannot be 
fully comprehended  by everyone in the market  or there would be no 
rewards  for innovating.'8  Secrecy,  deception,  and  incomplete  information 
17. Something like this diffusion process appears to describe the breakdown in 
the demand for money that occurred in 1973. For a discussion, see Scott E. Hein, 
"Dynamic Forecasting and the Demand for Money," Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Review, vol. 62 (June-July 1980), pp. 13-23. 
18. See Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "On the Impossibility of 
Informationally Efficient Markets," Stanford University Technical  Report  259 
(Stanford University, Institute for  Mathematical Studies in  the Social Sciences, 
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are ever-present barriers to a monetary authority seeking to apply mone- 
tary controls to an economy in transition. 
Fourth, the nature of discourse at the Federal Reserve makes it diffi- 
cult to convince the Federal Open Market Committee in a timely fashion 
that an innovation has occurred. The standard requirement for an inno- 
vation to  be  taken seriously is  empirical evidence  of  its  occurrence.'9 
This is obviously a "Catch 22" situation because no data about the inno- 
vation will have been collected. Thus monetary policy will be made on 
the assumption that nothing has happened. Once an innovation has been 
officially recognized to have occurred, it is necessary to devise a policy 
response that will attract near-unanimous support in the committee and 
will be defensible in the public domain. Many of the highly unorthodox 
policy actions taken by the Federal Reserve in the last eighteen months 
can only be understood in the light of  trying to  respond to  these  two 
constituencies. 
INNOVATION  AND  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  INTEREST  RATES 
Until the changes in operating procedure of October 1979, the federal 
funds rate was closely watched for clues about changes in monetary pol- 
icy. Although there had been a continuing shift in emphasis by the Fed- 
eral Reserve from controlling interest rates toward controlling monetary 
aggregates for about fifteen years, interest rates were convenient indica- 
tors because they were market statistics that could be accurately observed 
at short notice. The variability of the federal funds rate increased over 
time as the Federal Reserve shifted its emphasis increasingly from con- 
trolling interest rates toward controlling aggregates. The  variability of 
short-term interest rates since October 1979 is without precedent in the 
postwar period. 
All short-term interest rates reported in table 5 exhibited rising trends 
and increasing variability about these trends; they also moved  distinc- 
tively relative to one another as innovations were adopted. 
For example, a comparison of the interest rates on Treasury bills and 
on federal funds suggests that repurchase agreements were an important 
vehicle for avoiding restrictive monetary policy on several occasions in 
19. See John T. Woolley, "The Federal Reserve and the Political Economy of 
Monetary  Policy" (Ph.D. dissertation,  University of Wisconsin-Madison,  1980). 0  s  e  o o  4e  o  n  4  ON  N  ro  t  C  o 
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the recent past. The  existence  of  repurchase agreements increases the 
demand for U.S. government and agency securities because these securi- 
ties are required as collateral in such transactions. This collateral demand 
is likely to be of secondary importance when Federal Reserve policy is 
not restrictive. When monetary policy  is  restrictive, repurchase agree- 
ments ought to expand at the initiative of banks that seek to reduce their 
reserve requirements or corporations and state and local  governments 
that seek to obtain the resulting high nominal interest rates on their trans- 
actions balances. A  rough test of  this conjecture can be performed by 
comparing the three-month Treasury bill rate and the federal funds rate 
in table 5. Using an arbitrary  standard of a half percentage point differ- 
ence between the two rates, it can be  seen that the federal funds rate 
exceeded the Treasury bill rate by more than this amount in the eight 
quarters  beginning with 1973: 1, when demand functions for money began 
to go awry, and in 1980:2,  when marginal reserve requirements were re- 
moved for net purchased funds. Although no other positive differences of 
this magnitude occur in the quarters shown, since 1964 there we:e four 
other quarters when one existed:  1969:2,  1969:3,  1970: 1, and 1971:3. 
The first three occurred during a period of very restrictive monetary pol- 
icy when regulation Q ceilings were universally binding and marginal 
reserve requirements were applied to Eurodollar borrowings and bank- 
related commercial paper. The last quarter  was the beginning of President 
Nixon's wage and price freeze, when the growth of Ml  slowed down con- 
siderably for a period of almost six months. 
I interpret this pattern to indicate that repurchase agreements were a 
vehicle for avoiding the consequences of restrictive monetary policy  as 
measured by growth rates of aggregates such as Ml.  Repurchase agree- 
ments do not always perform in this role since other managed liabilities 
can also do the job. Their "safety valve" role can also be eliminated by 
imposing marginal reserve requirements like those of 1979:4  and 1980: 1. 
The changing relation between the prime loan interest rate at com- 
mercial banks and the commercial paper rate shown in table 5 reflects 
the effect of  new  sources of  funds to  business.  In only  three quarters 
between 1963  and 1974  did the prime loan rate exceed the commercial 
paper rate by as much as 0.75 percentage point (not shown in the table). 
Since the third quarter of 1974 the gap has never been lower than 1 point; 
since the fourth quarter of 1978 it has not been lower than 1.75 percent- Donald D. Hester  175 
age points. An interpretation is that growing access to the Eurodollar, 
repurchase agreement, and commercial paper markets by  large multi- 
national corporations is steadily reducing their dependence upon. com- 
mercial banks for loans. The prime loan interest rate has increasingly be- 
come a rate that applies to firms that lack access to such markets, have 
correspondingly weaker bargaining power in loan negotiations, and are 
more likely to default. With few exceptions, the commercial paper rate 
has stayed remarkably  close to the federal funds rate, which is the shadow 
price of outside money in the economy. 
Finally, consider the real federal funds rate, constructed with the rate 
of change of the GNP deflator. End-of-year data between 1963 and 1972 
indicate that the real federal funds rate was positive on average, but it 
was negative 40 percent of the time and in each of the three years leading 
up to the price explosion of 1973.  One does not need to be a monetarist 
to claim that monetary policy was expansive in the early years of the last 
decade.20  The quarterly data show the real federal funds rate fluctuated 
between being positive and negative until 1978:4,  when it turned positive 
(often strongly so)  through the end of 1980. During the 1973-78  period 
the real rate was positive in thirteen of twenty-four quarters, but its mean 
value was negative. On Wicksellian terms, again monetary policy was not 
restrictive in this period. 
An interpretation of these events is that by increasingly focusing on 
monetary aggregates, the Federal Reserve lost touch with the economy. 
During the years when innovations were being widely adopted, a given 
monetary aggregate's growth rate was associated with a lower than usual 
nominal interest rate and, therefore, a real interest rate that was lower 
than usual. As is shown below, financial innovations were permitting the 
measured income velocity of money to rise rapidly. Quantities that theo- 
retically should  have been  included in  definitions of  money-such  as 
overseas Eurodollar balances  of  corporations, repurchase agreements, 
and a variety of increasingly checkable consumer assets-were  ignored 
and not measured. 
20.  On an annual basis, in each year between 1959 and 1970 an average of daily 
federal funds rates exceeded the inflation rate as measured by the GNP  implicit 
price deflator by one percentage point or more. The real federal funds rate was 
negative for the years 1955 through 1958 and intermittently from 1971 through 
1977. It was not happenstance  that inflation was troubling in both periods. See the 
Economic  Report  of  the President,  January  1981,  pp. 239,  308. 176  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1  981 
INNOVATION  AND  MONETARY  AGGREGATES 
AS  GUIDES  TO  POLICY 
At a fundamental level, innovations in the past fifteen years have been 
particularly disruptive for the conduct of  monetary policy  because  its 
strategy has been misconceived. While innovations have caused behav- 
ioral relationships to change, they would have been much less damaging 
if policymakers had not been trying to control ill-defined monetary ag- 
gregates. To explain why, it is useful to start with a few propositions con- 
cerning financial markets. 
First, banks and other financial intermediaries survive and prosper by 
establishing long-term relationships with customers who are both borrow- 
ers and lenders. The  objective of  these institutions is  to  maximize the 
present value of these relationships, which may on occasion  (but obvi- 
ously not always)  mean lending at an interest rate that is below the cost 
of funds. They must try to provide for their customers' needs at all times 
or risk losing them to rivals, in the United States or abroad. Banks are to 
be sharply distinguished from brokers who  survive on brokerage fees, 
commissions,  and the  difference between bid prices and asked prices. 
Brokers prosper essentially from trading volume and turnover. 
Second, attempts to restrict the liabilities of financial intermediaries by 
a monetary authority are extremely threatening to the future profitability 
of their customer relationships. Unexpected curtailments when loan de- 
mand is high will provoke intense innovative efforts by intermediaries to 
find substitutes for whatever is being restricted. Some of these efforts will 
be successful, and close substitutes for some liabilities will emerge. Credit 
requirements of good customers will be satisfied. 
Third,  from  a  narrow  transactions-demand perspective,  published 
monetary aggregates are inappropriate for conducting monetary policy. 
It  is not  necessary to  reproduce the  familiar, finite alphanumeric se- 
quence of aggregate definitions or the discussion of their 1980 revisions 
to recognize the problems that arise from having multiple definitions.2' 
A  less  frequently discussed but no  less  important defect  of  monetary 
aggregates  is the fact that they are only measured at the close of a business 
21.  See Thomas D.  Simpson, "The Redefined Monetary Aggregates," Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, vol. 66 (February 1980), pp. 97-114. Donald D. Hester  177 
day when no transactions are occurring. Outside money is the sum of 
deposits at reserve banks and currency outstanding at that time. During 
a business day the volume of "immediately available funds" consists of 
this quantity plus a substantial quantity of additional funds that banks are 
allowed  to  regard as collected.  Immediately available funds  during a 
business day exceed the officially measured money base; the difference 
can roughly be approximated by the volume of overnight net purchased 
funds, perhaps 50  percent of member bank reserves in  1978.22  Imme- 
diately available funds are the transactions balances used by banks and 
their customers to  conduct business. They  are not proportional to  the 
overnight  level  of  outside  money  that  the  Federal  Reserve  controls. 
Banks and their customers can increase the ratio of immediately available 
funds to reserves by increasing the volume of funds that banks acquire 
through repurchase agreements. 
Fourth, once  the possibility of  innovations  and unobservable trans- 
actions balances is admitted, there is no basis for presuming that any par- 
ticular positive  nominal  or  real  rate of  interest will  result when  any 
particular monetary aggregate (including the monetary base)  is required 
to grow at some fixed rate. If real interest rates are generally perceived 
by investors to be negative, the incentive to borrow is unbounded, except 
for the presence of risk aversion, and financial institutions will face great 
net demands for funds. Traditionally it has been assumed that institu- 
tions would adjust to this condition by raising interest rates to discourage 
borrowing. However, it seems they also respond in part by devising new 
financial arrangements  that permit burgeoning loan demands to be profit- 
ably accommodated. 
In light of these facts, the strategy for monetary policy must be oriented 
toward reducing credit-demand pressures that banks  and  other inter- 
mediaries face, rather than presuming that they will passively translate 
quantitative restrictions on their liabilities into higher loan interest rates. 
If the public understood that the Federal Reserve would always require 
that the expected real federal funds rate be positive, inflationary expecta- 
tions  would  abate as would  the  current frenzy  about the  inflationary 
portent of recent growth rates in one or more monetary aggregates. Loan 
customers of intermediaries would weigh new borrowing decisions care- 
22. For an extended discussion, see Hester, "Effects  of Eurodollars  and Domes- 
tic Money Market  Innovations." 178  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
fully and not simply lurch at the prospect of a quick gain from borrowing 
at a negative real interest rate. 
This  strategy acknowledges that there are limits to  what monetary 
policy can achieve. Attempts to stimulate the economy with negative real 
rates of interest are likely to precipitate inflationary expectations and a 
new round of innovations. Attempts to stem inflation quickly with very 
high real interest rates may also breed innovations such as money-market 
mutual funds. Persistent high real interest rates can dampen capital for- 
mation. There will  continue to be  a need for discretion in  setting the 
nominal federal funds rate in relation to  expectations  about inflation; 
monetary policy will only be as sound as the people and information that 
guide it. Avoiding a negative expected real interest rate for any extended 
period is only a necessary condition for controlling inflation; it is hardly 
a formula for conducting policy. 
In sharp contrast to this strategy, the announced policy in recent years 
has been  to  set  growth rates as  objectives  for  certain aggregates and 
largely to ignore interest rates. This policy  has not succeeded because 
innovations invalidated the justification for any particular growth target. 
Table 6 provides some evidence in support of this interpretation;  it reports 
annual percentage growth rates for the principal monetary aggregates and 
their associated income velocities, using both the old and new definitions 
of the aggregates. Although varying growth rates in the aggregates have 
sometimes been blamed for poor economic performance, as the means 
data at the bottom of the table show, the annual changes in velocities 
have been more variable than the annual changes in the aggregates them- 
selves. 
Narrowly defined money velocities (velocities for Ml  and MiB)  grew 
especially fast in 1961  and 1962 when the competition for savings and 
time deposits was escalating, in 1965  and 1966 when interest rates rose 
in response to monetary policy initiatives and the Vietnam War escala- 
tion,  in  1973  when net purchased funds  surged, and in  the  1975-79 
period  as  the  innovations  were  increasingly being  assimilated.23 The 
longer-period growth rates, the five-year averages in the middle section of 
the table, indicate all the aggregates grew successively faster in each of 
the first three intervals shown, while  in the fourth interval the growth 
23. The M2 velocities are not more reliable. As the means data in table 6 reveal, 
annual M2 velocity growth rates are 20 percent and 35 percent more volatile, based 
on old and new data, respectively,  than the Ml  and MlB velocity growth rates. Donald D. Hester  179 
Table 6.  Annual Growth Rates of Monetary Aggregates and Associated Income 
Velocities,  1960-79 
Percent 
Aggregates  Income velocities 
Year or  Old  Old  New  New  Old  Old  New  New 
period  Ml  M2  MIB  M2  Ml  M2  MIB  M2 
Annual data 
1960  0.4  2.6  0.6  4.6  1.8  -0.3  1.7  -2.3 
1961  2.8  5.4  2.8  7.1  4.2  1.7  4.3  0.0 
1962  1.4  5.9  1.8  8.0  4.4  0.0  4.0  -2.0 
1963  4.0  7.0  4.0  8.6  2.6  -0.3  2.6  -1.8 
1964  4.5  6.7  4.4  7.9  1.3  -0.8  1.4  -2.0 
1965  4.3  8.6  4.4  8.0  5.8  1.7  5.8  2.2 
1966  2.9  6.0  2.7  4.9  5.1  2.0  5.3  3.1 
1967  6.4  9.9  6.3  9.3  -0.3  -3.4  -0.2  -2.9 
1968  7.6  9.0  7.4  8.0  1.6  0.3  1.7  1.2 
1969  3.9  3.2  3.8  4.2  2.5  3.2  2.6  2.3 
1970  4.8  7.2  4.8  5.8  -0.3  -2.6  -0.3  -1.2 
1971  6.6  11.3  6.6  13.5  2.8  -1.6  2.7  -3.5 
1972  8.4  11.2  8.5  12.9  3.1  0.5  3.0  -1.0 
1973  6.2  8.8  5.8  7.3  4.6  2.1  5.1  3.5 
1974  5.1  7.7  4.7  6.0  2.0  -0.5  2.4  1.1 
1975  4.6  8.4  4.9  12.3  5.2  1.5  4.9  -2.0 
1976  5.8  10.9  6.0  13.7  3.9  -0.9  3.7  -3.3 
1977  7.9  9.8  8.1  11.5  4.0  2.2  3.9  0.7 
1978  7.2  8.7  8.2  8.4  5.8  4.3  4.8  4.6 
1979  5.5  8.3  8.0  8.8  4.2  1.4  1.8  1.0 
Five-year averages 
1960-64  2.6  5.5  2.7  7.2  2.9  0.1  2.8  -1.6 
1965-69  5.0  7.3  4.9  6.9  2.9  0.8  3.0  1.2 
1970-74  6.2  9.2  6.1  9.1  2.4  -0.4  2.6  -0.2 
1975-79  6.2  9.2  7.0  10.9  4.6  1.7  3.8  0.2 
Means of absolute  values of 
annual first differences 
1960-79  1.6  2.0  1.4  2.5  2.0  2.4  2.0  2.7 
Source: Federal Reserve  Bulletini, vol. 66 (February 1980), pp. 112-13. 
rates increased for the two new aggregate measures, but not for the old. 
Velocity growth rates peaked in the fourth for all measures except new 
M2, which includes many of the innovations of that period such as over- 
night Caribbean branch deposits, overnight repurchase agreements, and 
money-market mutual fund shares. 
Policymakers could  observe only the  old  aggregates until last year. 180  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1981 
It is easy to see how monetary policy may have become inadvertently too 
expansionary if the Federal Reserve was assuming that velocities were on 
their historic trends. Indeed,  the real federal funds rate was unusually 
low between 1973  and 1978,  at the time when velocities first began to 
accelerate. There is no reason to believe that the new monetary aggre- 
gates are going to be any more reliable in the future. 
Events since the new aggregates policy was announced on October 6, 
1979,  also testify to the problems confronting an aggregates approach. 
While the monetary base has grown at a fairly steady rate-primarily 
because of steady increases in currency holdings by the public-nominal 
interest rates, real interest rates, MlA,  and MlB  have fluctuated greatly 
in patterns that are reminiscent of those in 1973  and 1974.  These fluc- 
tuations have been accompanied by a plethora of marginal reserve re- 
quirements, discount rate surcharges, emergency credit controls, unen- 
forceable suasions,  and opinions  that can be  found in the sections  on 
announcements and legal developments of the Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
which are rapidly becoming its main features. 
To illustrate, in October 1979 the Federal Reserve imposed marginal 
reserve requirements on federal funds purchases from nonmember banks, 
on funds acquired through repurchase agreements, and on net Eurodollar 
borrowings. In March 1980,  using its powers under the Credit Control 
Act  of  1969,  the Federal Reserve imposed additional marginal reserve 
requirements on money-market mutual funds, on sales finance debt, and 
on credit card debt, much of which is financed in the commercial paper 
market. There is no clear connection between these actions and the MlA 
and MlB  aggregates that were first defined in the February 1980 Federal 
Reserve Bulletin.  After the sharp collapse  in the  economy  during the 
second quarter of 1980, these marginal reserve requirements were aban- 
doned. The new aggregates policy was allowed to operate without such 
supplements for the first time in the third quarter, when MlB  grew at 
about twice its target rate. 
COMPETITION  AND  CONTROL 
Since the days of the Commission on Money and Credit it has been 
clear that changes in regulations and law are necessary to cope with new Donald D. Hester  181 
activities that are being undertaken by financial intermediaries. Congress 
has passed several important bills in recent years in an attempt to estab- 
lish a suitable legal framework within which money and capital markets 
could efficiently function-the  International Banking Act,  the Financial 
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 and, most 
important, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con- 
trol Act  of  1980.  Partly in response to these legislative initiatives and 
partly on its own, the Federal Reserve has issued a large number of im- 
portant rulings and opinions in the past few years. 
A common theme of many of these laws, regulations, and opinions is 
encouragement of competition and elimination of artificial legal barriers 
such as differences in reserve requirements for similar deposits, interest 
rate ceilings, ability to branch, lending powers, and access to government 
services. The result of their elimination will be the disappearance of many 
monopolistic  quasi-rents that had been haphazardly sprinkled through 
the financial system. If this process is allowed to run its course, the num- 
ber of independent U.S. financial institutions can be expected to shrink 
considerably, and the nature of financial assets can be expected to change. 
The existing system has not fully assimilated the innovations that have 
been discussed above, and competition is a dynamic process that surely 
will be innovative. 
A suggestion of what may be in store can be gleaned from the recent 
experience with money-market mutual funds. These funds attracted de- 
positors  at  commercial  banks  and  thrift institutions  that  were  being 
heavily penalized by  arbitrary and low  interest-rate ceilings.  The very 
existence of the money-market funds encouraged banks and thrift insti- 
tutions to offer money-market certificates, NOW  (negotiable  orders of 
withdrawal)  accounts,  and several higher interest-rate time  accounts. 
Although it is arguable that depository institutions would have offered 
these accounts in any event because of rising inflation and slow growth of 
their deposits,  the expansion  of  money-market funds has  certainly in- 
creased the pressure for such changes since  1977.  The growth of these 
funds undoubtedly encouraged Congress to begin to eliminate interest- 
rate ceilings in the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980. 
The services of money-market funds are similar to those of brokers; 
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Because the funds have approximately matched the maturities of  their 
assets and liabilities and have made no interest-rate commitments to their 
creditors, in periods of fluctuating interest rates they have a comparative 
advantage relative to institutions that attempt to provide services through 
fixed interest-rate commitments. 
Commercial banks and thrift institutions are adapting by altering the 
mix of services they provide. Increasingly, all types of loans  are being 
offered only on a "floating rate" basis. Some thrift institutions will only 
make very short maturity mortgage loans and thus are reducing the pack- 
age of services they offer. Some have learned to hedge their positions in 
financial-instrument  futures markets. Others are increasingly behaving as 
if they were mortgage bankers. They use mortgage pools to place fixed- 
and variable-rate mortgages with the Federal National Mortgage Associa- 
tion and investors with long-term liabilities such as insurance companies 
and pension funds. The result of all these changes will be a much more 
efficient capital market in which the risk of inflation and fluctuations in 
the interest rate will be far more equitably shared between debtors and 
creditors. Money-market funds have played  a major role  in hastening 
these reforms. 
Increasing competition also promises to modify the implementation of 
monetary policy. Recently the federal government and its financial regu- 
latory agencies have felt compelled  temporarily to  support or bail out 
weak large institutions such as the Franklin National Bank, the city of 
New York, the First Pennsylvania Bank, and a number of  endangered 
thrift institutions. Each of these decisions may be defensible on grounds 
of equity and efficiency, but each also softened the bite of monetary pol- 
icy. Monetary policy works by discouraging individuals and firms from 
spending or expanding by making interest rates high and by depriving 
potential borrowers of their access to money  and capital markets. The 
threat that credit may become too expensive or may be denied loses its 
force if firms can count on being bailed out. 
Ratios of equity to debt and profit margins at large bank holding com- 
panies appear to be declining as a result of growing international compe- 
tition. Failures and high leverage are as much a part of competition as 
death and high blood pressure are a part of life. Competition is likely to 
increase the fragility of the financial system and limit the set of policy 
moves that the Federal Reserve  can undertake. There is no  reason to 
think that the Federal Reserve would persist in aiming for some macro Donald D. Hester  183 
target if it became clear that large banks were imperiled. Limits on com- 
petition are probably a prerequisite for strong monetary policy. 
Conclusion 
The  financial system will  be  in  transition for  most  of  the  current 
decade. Monetary policy will have a major role to play in stabilizing and 
guiding the U.S.  economy  through this transition. This paper suggests 
several important guidelines for  conducting policy  during this period. 
First, nominal interest rates must be kept high enough to ensure that the 
public perceives real interest rates to be positive. Negative real interest 
rates have the potential to destabilize. Second, attention must be directed 
to the financial soundness of institutions in order to prevent sizable fail- 
ures as the process of  consolidation  proceeds.  Bank examinations will 
need to be strengthened, and some limits on competition are inevitable. 
Third, it will be necessary to collect more information about immediately 
available funds and about offshore banking activities that create close 
substitutes for outside money. It may be necessary to impede the trans- 
fers of funds domestically or outside the United States with wire transfer 
fees or other devices to retard growth in the volume of overnight Euro- 
dollars and repurchase agreements. Fourth, greater coordination of fed- 
eral credit programs and monetary policy will be necessary. Finally, the 
Federal Reserve should renounce target growth rates for any monetary 
aggregate. The one clear lesson from recent history is that financial insti- 
tutions innovate whenever customer relationships are jeopardized by slow 
monetary growth. 
APPENDIX 
The Design of Optimal  Monetary  Policy 
in the Presence  of Changing  Parameters 
THIS  APPENDIX  is a highly stylized illustration of how innovations alter 
policymaking in the context of a linear-difference equation system. Con- 184  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1981 
sider the conventional linear-difference equation system, 
(A-1)  BYt =  AXt +  CYt-1  +  DUt +  Et, 
where Yt is a vector of contemporaneous endogenous variables; Xt is a 
known vector of contemporaneous and lagged exogenous variables; Ut is 
a vector of policy instruments-  available to some hypothetical monetary 
authority; Et is a vector of random variables with finite variances; B is a 
known m X m matrix having rank m; and A, C, and D are known m X n, 
m X m, and m X p matrices, respectively. Innovations cause the param- 
eters in A-1 to be time-varying, resulting in 
(A-2)  BtYt =  AtXt +  CtYt-,  +  DtUt +  Et. 
It is well known that a linear difference equation system of any order 
can be expressed as a first-order  state variable system such as A-1 above.24 
If the monetary authority does not know values for Xt,  Yt,  and Et, that 
authority will not be able to achieve its target values, and the system is not 
perfectly controllable. A sufficient set of conditions for perfect control of 
a model such as A-1  over a finite time interval is that values of all ele- 
ments in these vectors be known to the monetary authority and that there 
exist a subset of the elements in Ut that is of order m whose correspond- 
ing partition in D has rank m. 
If the monetary authority has a loss function that is quadratic, then the 
certainty equivalence principle implies  that optimal policy  instrument 
settings for model A-1 are linear functions of Xt, Yt-l, and the authority's 
targets.25  If this system of linear equations is solved once over some plan- 
ning period, t =  1, . . . , T, the resulting sequence of instrument settings 
constitutes open-loop control. If new information about the state of the 
system becomes available during the planning period and the linear sys- 
tem is repeatedly solved  to incorporate this information, the resulting 
sequence of vectors constitutes open-loop control with feedback.  Policy 
instrument settings that are generated using open loop with feedback are 
equivalent to those that emerge from an alternative dynamic program- 
ming  or  closed-loop  formulation.26 The  equivalence  between  the  two 
24.  See Gregory C. Chow, Analysis and Control of Dynamic Economic Systems 
(John Wiley, 1975), pp. 152-56. 
25. See H. Theil, Optimal Decision Rules for Government and Industry (Am- 
sterdam: North-Holland, 1964), pp. 32-52. 
26.  See Alfred L.  Norman, "On the  Relationship Between Linear Feedback 
Control and First Period Certainty Equivalence,"  International  Economic Review, 
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approaches breaks down if either the model is nonlinear or if the loss 
function is not quadratic; it also breaks down if the coefficients in A-1 
are random.27 
To analyze the effects of innovations, it is necessary to make assump- 
tions about the nature of parameter time dependence in expression A-2. 
I  consider  three  specifications  of  parameter change:  first,  randomly 
changing-the  output from some stationary stochastic process, second, 
exogenously changing-predictably  changing in proportion to some ex- 
ogenous variable (possibly  just time),  and third, endogenously chang- 
ing-predictably  changing in proportion to some endogenous variable. 
The placement of the changing parameters in matrices of expression A-2 
is also important. In the subsequent discussion the possibility of a param- 
eter change in each of the four matrices is briefly considered. Throughout 
this discussion it is assumed that B is always full rank and that the num- 
ber of policy instruments is always less than the number of target vari- 
ables appearing with nonzero weights in the policymaker's loss function, 
which for convenience  is  assumed to  be  quadratic and time invariant 
relative to some arbitrary  target path. 
Random  Coefficients 
In the case of random coefficients, the interpretation of technical prog- 
ress is that change is occurring at some basic level in the economy and 
appears as shocks to parameters in a model whose signs and magnitudes 
are not observed. For expositional convenience it is assumed that a single 
representative parameter in each of the matrices consists of a stationary 
expected value and a random component with zero expected value and 
finite variance.28  The random variable is assumed to be independent of 
other variables appearing in A-2. If the parameter occurs in the A matrix, 
the problem is not substantially different from that of controlling with no 
parameter uncertainty. The error term in the affected equation can be 
27.  See Robert S. Holbrook and E. Philip Howrey, "A Comparison  of the Chow 
and Theil Optimization Procedures in  the  Presence of  Parameter Uncertainty," 
International  Economic  Review,  vol. 19 (October 1978), pp. 749-59. 
28. This expository assumption  is very strong and not plausible in general unless 
the final form equation of the structural  model is a first-order  difference equation. 
In realistic control problems, a given parameter will appear in several equations 
once the model has been expressed  in state variable form. 186  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
thought of  as the sum of two random variables and, therefore, targets 
will be more difficult to achieve in probability. If the random parameter 
occurs in  the D  matrix, the  problem is  similar to  one  considered  by 
Brainard.29  His argument suggests that it will be optimal to have the abso- 
lute value of the associated policy instrument smaller than it is in the case 
of parameter certainty. If the parameter occurs in the B matrix, reduced- 
form parameters will all have unobserved shocks that are typically not 
independent of one another. In this case, one cannot conclude that any 
instrument should be used less vigorously than in the case of parameter 
certainty. 
Finally, if the random coefficient occurs in C, impact multipliers are 
not affected, but the model may at times be stable and at other times un- 
stable. A virtue of optimal control in the linear-quadratic framework is 
that  it  heavily  penalizes  large  deviations  from  target paths  and  thus 
stabilizes systems that would otherwise be unstable. The principle of con- 
tinuity allows one, therefore, to infer that the nature of the optimal solu- 
tion when an element of C is random would be that some policy instru- 
ments would tend to respond to deviations of the element's corresponding 
endogenous variable from its nominal path more than would be the case 
with parameter certainty.30 
When several or all parameters in the various matrices have random 
components, a variety of patterns of policy instrument responses are pos- 
sible. It is important to note that in all the cases considered there con- 
tinues to  be  an optimal  control  mandate for  intervention with  policy 
instruments when random coefficients exist, even when the random com- 
ponent values are unknowable after the fact.31 There is no  ground for 
believing that technical progress that manifests itself in random coeffi- 
29.  See William C.  Brainard, "Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of  Policy," 
American  Economic  Review,  vol. 57  (May 1967, Papers  and  Proceedings,  1966), 
pp. 411-25. 
30.  See Roger Craine, "Optimal  Monetary Policy with Uncertainty,"  Journal  of 
Economic  Dynamics  and  Control,  vol. 1 (February 1979), pp. 59-83. 
31. The possibility  that one can take advantage  of recent data to draw inferences 
about random shocks through filtering techniques has been intensively investigated 
by Tinsley and others at the Federal Reserve in a series of path-breaking  papers. 
See J. H. Kalchbrenner  and P. A. Tinsley with J. Berry and B. Garrett, "On Filter- 
ing Auxiliary Information in Short-run Monetary Policy," in  Karl Brunner and 
Allan H. Meltzer, eds., Optimal  Policies,  Control  Theory,  and  Technology  Exports, 
Carnegie-Rochester  Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 7 (Amsterdam: North- 
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cients reduces the optimal amount of response of policy instruments in 
general, although such progress surely increases the volatility of endoge- 
nous variables and is likely to increase differences between realized and 
target path values. 
Exogenously Changing Coefficients 
The motivation for considering exogenously  changing parameters is 
that this formulation captures two recognizable forms of technical change: 
the fully anticipated introduction of a new exogenous variable in a struc- 
tural equation of a model, and the fully anticipated drift in one or more 
parameters that often accompanies the diffusion of an innovation across 
firms in an industry. When the parameters in a model change exogenously 
and predictably, the possibility exists that control will not be impaired at 
all. With a linear model and quadratic loss function, policy instruments 
in open-loop  control with feedback continue to  be  linear functions of 
target path values  and predetermined variables. Open loop  with feed- 
back and closed-loop  control solutions will be equivalent in this specifi- 
cation because the sequence of parameter changes is assumed to be fully 
perceived. 
With one important exception, few general conclusions about control 
can be drawn in the case of exogenously  changing parameters. Clearly 
policymakers must allow for the effects of a changing element in A when 
making forecasts or setting controls. If the changing parameter occurs in 
D, the dosage of some policy instruments (usually  all)  will need to be 
adjusted, but the appealing notion that one  should reduce the dose  of 
some instrument if the absolute value of one of its associated parameters 
rises is not sound. Similarly, knowledge that a parameter in B is changing 
does not yield  much insight about controllability,  except  when B  ap- 
proaches singularity. 
An especially important case in financial markets is a parameter  change 
in an element of C because many innovations are in a form that reduces 
transactions  costs and thus reduces inertia in markets. Lagged endogenous 
variables are prominent in the financial sectors of most large structural 
models such as the public version of the Federal Reserve Board's quar- 
terly model. A  change in C does not concern impact multipliers but is 
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To  appreciate this case,  consider the  example  of  a  single-equation 
model, 
(A-3)  yt  =  a +  CYt-1  +  dut +  et. 
Technical progress that reduces inertia does not necessarily modify the 
equilibrium level of y. In this example it is assumed that an equilibrium 
level of y exists and is not altered by a technical change. The technical 
change involves a proportional change in c that is matched by offsetting 
proportional changes in a and d. The long-run equilibrium level of y for 
equation A-3 is 
(A-4)  a +  du 
If c falls by some fraction, r, these assumptions imply that the counterpart 
of A-3 after the change is 
(A-5)  Yt =  (1  -  r)cyti  +  I  +  c)(a  +  dut +  et). 
Equation A-5 implies that the system becomes less controllable because 
the variability of shock terms is amplified. An interpretation is that the 
lagged endogenous variable provides a valuable mitigation service for 
policymakers by averaging together a sequence of random shocks, thereby 
exploiting a variation of the law of large numbers. This averaging con- 
tribution is weaker when r is positive. The relevance of this example to 
models such as A-2 depends upon the nature of C in large models and the 
extent to which the assumptions of the example are satisfied. 
Endogenously Changing Coefficients and Rational Expectations 
An  even less tractable problem for analysis is when parameters are 
predictably changing in proportion to some endogenous variable. In part 
this is because the values of endogenous variables are themselves stochas- 
tic, which implies that the case of endogenously changing coefficients is a 
hybrid of the cases of randomly and exogenously changing coefficients. 
Open-loop  control with feedback and closed-loop  control solutions are 
not equivalent in these circumstances. From another perspective, when 
parameters are proportional to endogenous variables, the model's repre- 
sentation in A-2 is seriously misleading. Under these conditions the model 
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Nevertheless, extreme values of endogenous variables such as interest 
rates do lead  to innovations involving new operating methods or new 
instruments. A  distinctive feature of these innovations is that they are 
irreversible; once they appear, changes such as negotiable certificates of 
deposit,  Eurobranches,  money-market  mutual  funds,  and  repurchase 
agreements persist, even after interest rates fall away from peaks. Such 
"ratchet innovations" are a major part of postwar changes in financial 
markets. 
Ratchet innovations may permit optimal control techniques to be ap- 
plied within limits. If interest rates do not cross a threshold that calls 
forth a new regime, a model in which the only endogenously changing 
coefficients are of the form of ratchet innovations is linear. In this con- 
ditional sense of no regime change, optimal control techniques involving 
both open loop with feedback and closed loop  can be applied, and the 
solutions will be equivalent. It is an illusory victory; the techniques are 
only useful when they are not used forcefully! 
There is a related large rational expectations literature that denies (or 
at least  questions)  the  effectiveness of  persistent discretionary policy; 
this literature appears to imply the existence of endogenously changing 
coefficients.32  I interpret its authors to be claiming that individual deci- 
sionmakers will modify parameters in expression A-2  in ways that will 
nullify the effects of discretionary changes in the elements of Ut. Discus- 
sions of rational expectations tend to be incomplete because one rarely is 
informed  about  which  decisionmakers  change  which  parameters and 
about the rates of change of parameters. If parameters change slowly and 
in a predictable manner, persistent discretionary policies can be effective. 
In the foregoing discussion it has been assumed that rational expecta- 
tions arguments weaken but do not nullify the effects of persistent dis- 
cretionary policies.  The reasons for this assumption are my beliefs that 
individuals and firms are risk-averse, that capital markets are inherently 
incomplete, that bankruptcy losses  are uninsurable risks, that the costs 
for processing and disseminating information are too high for anything 
approaching full disclosure to exist, and that fragmented information sys- 
tems are likely to prevent the full realization of the basic rational expecta- 
tions denial of the effectiveness of persistent discretionary policy. 
32. For references,  see Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Methods  and Problems in Business 
Cycle  Theory,"  Journal  of  Money,  Credit  and  Banking,  vol.  12, pt.  2  (November 
1980),pp.  696-715. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Andrew S. Carron: To say that U.S. credit markets are now undergoing 
unprecedented changes would be to speak the truth, but a truth with a 
certain familiarity. Financial institutions in the United States have been 
evolving rapidly, particularly during the past twenty years, and inducing 
new and unanticipated corporate structures and investment alternatives. 
Donald Hester explains what has motivated these innovations, what their 
effect has been, and why there should be concern about them. In doing so, 
he  has provided a useful foundation  for  discussion  of  an  appropriate 
policy response. Hester himself initiates that discussion in the last sec- 
tions of his paper, but it is by no means resolved. 
He  postulates three forces that motivate financial innovation:  rising 
and volatile interest rates, regulations and regulatory changes, and am- 
biguities in domains of surveillance by monetary and fiscal authorities. 
Firms and individuals make their investment decisions from the set of 
available alternatives until one or more of these forces compel financial 
institutions to  innovate,  and thereby to  survive. The  innovation,  even 
when successful, is not adopted instantaneously and may elude detection 
for a considerable time. In these initial stages, the monetary authorities are 
still operating under their previous view of the world, and thus are relying 
on increasingly incomplete information. Putting the case more concretely, 
Hester shows that attempts to restrict the stock of "money" will ultimately 
fail because institutions can create usable substitutes more readily than 
controls can be extended to cover them. 
Recent financial history, then, is a cycle of credit restraint fostering 
innovations, which subsequently lead to  further restraint. Hester illus- 
trates this pattern in his review of seven major innovations and the eco- 
nomic circumstances surrounding their creation. 
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The process generating financial innovations could be  characterized 
somewhat differently, however, and by doing so the debate on formulat- 
ing a policy response can be  sharpened. If  one  assumes that financial 
markets are initially in equilibrium, innovation comes about as a result 
of some change in the supply or demand schedule. Interest rate move- 
ments, the first of the forces Hester notes, constitute such a change, but 
the existence of regulations or gaps in regulatory surveillance does not. 
These latter forces are more appropriately viewed as fixed constraints. 
There are price (interest rate)  and quantity (reserves)  controls. The 
existing regulatory constraints bind when exogenous factors  (inflation) 
shift the market-clearing  point out of the permissible range. Then institu- 
tions are motivated to incur the costs of innovation so that the market 
can clear within the existing constraints and loopholes.  New regulations 
may follow, and in that way be considered a force for innovation, but to 
view such change as the motivating force would be to obscure cause and 
effect. Interest rate levels  and swings, and the underlying supplies and 
demands for funds they represent, are the initiating forces. The regulatory 
response can then be analyzed in terms of Hester's model, in which the 
policy authorities either do not know all the instruments that are avail- 
able or else for legal reasons cannot use them. 
The effort to restrict monetary aggregates will be successful only to the 
extent that financial markets are segmented because there are too many 
substitutes for money that cannot be controlled. Policy thus focuses on 
instruments and quantities that can be affected and on the maintenance 
of artificial  barriers among market segments. Deposit interest-rate ceilings 
and reserve requirements affect only parts of the capital markets. Restric- 
tions on branching and the composition of assets, minimum balance re- 
quirements, and the tax treatment of thrift institutions are impediments 
to the flow of capital between sectors. Innovations thus may arise either 
to evade restrictions in a given sector (negotiable certificates of deposit, 
repurchase agreements, bank holding companies, Eurobranching, money- 
market mutual funds) or to lower barriers  between sectors (federal credit 
programs, futures markets). 
This distinction is important. The desire to reduce market segmentation 
may proceed even in the absence of monetary restraint. Hester does not 
make this point explicitly, but it does appear in his data. This may be seen 
in his discussion of federal credit programs. The secular narrowing of the 
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given as the starting point for major federal intervention in the mortgage 
market. In fact, although not shown in table 3, federal credit agencies 
played a major role in supplying funds to the housing and agriculture 
sectors as early as 1957. 
Such efforts to facilitate the flow of capital among sectors, which may 
derive from demographic shifts or other demand or supply changes un- 
related to the control of monetary aggregates, are consistent with Hester's 
model. They result from a desire to equalize interest rates across sectors, 
whether those rates are high or low. These innovations improve allocative 
efficiency. True, they blunt the impact of monetary policy, but that is be- 
cause the federal credit programs move  the market closer  to  efficient 
operation. In the paper these are seen as politically motivated attempts to 
subsidize housing  and agriculture. Some  of  the programs do  advance 
credit on terms more favorable than actuarially sound. But most-Veter- 
ans Administration guarantees, Federal Housing Administration insur- 
ance, and Federal National Mortgage Association purchases, for example 
-are  more appropriately  evaluated as measures that remove impediments 
to the flow of capital between sectors. In any case, one cannot argue that 
the quantity of credit advanced under federal auspices is indicative of the 
level of subsidization (the attempt to evade controls).  A plausible case 
can be made that the privatization of the sponsored credit agencies after 
1968 reduced the subsidy component and focused the emphasis on capi- 
tal market efficiency. Regulatory policy that increases market segmenta- 
tion as an adjunct to monetary restraint thus has effects that go beyond 
the general suppression of economic activity. 
Hester's conclusions may be generally viewed as favoring innovations, 
particularly insofar as they improve efficiency. Few would disagree with 
that point. Moreover,  the  rewards to  innovation  are so  great and the 
regulatory structure so limited that the trend will continue. Indeed, at this 
very time, a number of significant innovations have been unveiled:  the 
retail repurchase agreement, NOW  accounts  on  foreign branches, the 
possibility of interstate branching by thrift institutions, and new types of 
adjustable-rate  mortgages. 
The level and volatility of interest rates are thus seen as the major fac- 
tors inducing innovation. Hester's consideration of interest rate prescrip- 
tions is therefore on the mark. Given the prospect of continuing change 
in U.S. financial markets, his policy recommendations seem unequal to 
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gates while permitting improvements in allocative and transaction effi- 
ciency. If we are to rely on monetary restraint, forestalling innovation 
may be necessary. The preceding argues for concentrating regulatory re- 
strictions on innovations that serve principally to evade monetary policy 
by removing funds from federal control rather than on those that shift 
credit among sectors. Particularly disturbing, therefore, is Hester's obser- 
vation that large banks can hold the Federal Reserve hostage by taking 
big risks, knowing that the viability of the banks is more important than 
any particular monetary target. By extension, then, no policy of restrict- 
ing bank lending (whether through regulation or monetary policy)  can 
work. Perhaps that is the essence of the message. A valid conclusion may 
be that restrictive monetary policy will never be maintained for very long 
either because it does work (too well)  or because it does not (as a result 
of innovation).  We would do well to look elsewhere for weapons against 
inflation. 
Stephen M.  Goldfeld:  Donald  Hester has  given us  an  interesting and 
thoughtful paper on a variety of issues in monetary policy. Hester empha- 
sizes the importance of financial innovations that have changed monetary 
practices and, indeed, most of  the paper is  devoted to  explaining and 
documenting  the  key  innovations.  These  inevitably  affect  the  proper 
course of monetary policy,  especially when one recognizes that innova- 
tions may be partially induced by monetary policy. Hester ably illustrates 
the difficulties created by ongoing innovations and makes several recom- 
mendations for adapting policy.  Two  of  these stand out-namely  that 
the  Federal  Reserve  should  renounce  having  target growth  rates for 
monetary aggregates and, instead, should  adopt a discretionary policy 
focusing on real interest rates. 
The existence and importance of financial innovations is undeniable 
and,  I  wholeheartedly  agree,  casts  serious  doubt  on  the  meaning  of 
various monetary aggregates and therefore on the wisdom of a mecha- 
nistic monetary target approach to policy. I also concur with the notion 
that real interest rates have a potentially important role to play in mone- 
tary policy. Nevertheless, I remain a bit uneasy with the strong tone of 
the policy  conclusions.  While the paper does  give  a "pep" talk to  the 
Federal Reserve and even points them in the right direction, it falls short 
of presenting a fully articulated policy alternative. Furthermore, it seems 
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my comments are largely devoted to the elaboration of  these points,  I 
first want to dispose of a few thoughts on innovations per se. 
Much has been written in recent years about innovation. There is often 
a bit of schizophrenia in these discussions about whether or not innova- 
tion is good. On the one hand, innovations tend to contribute to a more 
efficient capital market; on the other, they tend to complicate the task of 
monetary policy  and reduce its effectiveness. This conflict is evident in 
Hester's paper as it was in the recent discussion by Albert Wojnilower in 
BPEA,  2:1980.  Thus Hester recognizes the virtues of innovations, but he 
suggests the need to limit competition and to impede various types of 
flows of funds. There seems to be no clear way, however, to evaluate how 
one strikes a sensible balance in this regard, and Hester therefore does not 
discuss how much friction is really desirable. 
Desirability aside, it also is important to understand why innovation 
comes about. Hester conveys a sense of this by his detailed analyses of a 
number of important innovations. Although these analyses have a loose 
framework regarding what stimulates innovations, no general theory of 
innovations is provided. This is hardly a criticism of the paper, but the 
absence of such theory does suggest that policymakers are likely to ex- 
perience difficulties in sorting out possible  innovations ex  ante. Hester 
argues that, even ex post, policymakers are likely to experience difficulty 
in recognizing that innovations have taken place. This same line of argu- 
ment leads him to eschew any sort of formal econometric analysis of the 
consequences  of  innovations in favor of  presenting bits  and pieces  of 
suggestive evidence. Here I think he was being overly pessimistic, but 
nevertheless his basic point is well taken-that  is, lags in the process of 
recognizing the full consequences of innovations are a potential serious 
impediment to the conduct of monetary policy. 
Hester gives rather low marks to the performance of monetary policy 
over the past decade. He  observes that by at least one simple measure 
(discussed  further below)  the real rate of  interest was inappropriately 
negative from 1970 to  1972  and importantly contributed to the dismal 
inflation that followed. Over the years from 1973 to  1978-a  period in 
which Hester characterizes the Federal Reserve as increasing its focus on 
monetary aggregates and losing  touch with the economy-the  average 
real rate of interest by his measure was essentially zero. Innovations play 
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High nominal rates of interest stimulated a variety of changes in cash- 
management techniques, which served to increase monetary velocity and 
shift the relation between money and interest rates. And banks, scram- 
bling to satisfy the loan demand of their valued customers, found innova- 
tive ways to circumvent the restrictive policies of the Federal Reserve. 
Based  on  this  experience,  Hester  concludes  that  monetary  policy 
should focus on real interest rates, while aiming to achieve an adequately 
positive real rate, and the Federal Reserve should abandon its policy of 
targeting on monetary aggregates. Indeed,  Hester  states that develop- 
ments since October 1979 testify to the "problem confronting an aggre- 
gates approach." Although I am sympathetic to the intent of these recom- 
mendations, more needs  to  be  said about both  real interest rates and 
monetary aggregates. 
While the notion of avoiding negative real rates of interest seems clearly 
desirable, more precision is necessary if real rates are to guide policy. 
Hester does suggest that the Federal Reserve must avoid real rates that 
are too low or too high because both extremes will stimulate innovations 
that confound policy, but he is relatively silent on the Goldilocks ques- 
tion of how  to decide which real rate is "just right." He  does  not say 
much, for example, about the period after mid-1978  when his measures 
show a rather positive average real rate but yet, at least by implication, 
monetary policy was still inadequate. Is the rate in this period too high 
or not high enough? Is it too variable or is it inappropriate in some other 
way? More  generally,  how  should  real  rates be  varied  to  cope  with 
shocks of various types? Being able to answer such questions would in- 
crease my confidence that, as Hester suggests, we can leave the choice of 
the appropriate real rate to discretionary monetary policy. 
A related issue in this regard is the proper measurement of the real 
rate of interest. There is the question of which nominal rate should form 
the basis for the calculation, and this involves, among other things, the 
choice of a horizon. There is also the issue of the corresponding inflation 
rate and how expected inflation is to be estimated. Another complication 
concerns the treatment of taxes-should  we be dealing with an after-tax 
real rate? Hester is well aware of these issues and recommends use of the 
real federal funds rate. I did not, however, find the justification for this 
choice to be fully convincing. The empirical importance of various defini- 
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however, does confirm the impression that real rates have been negative 
in the 1970s.'  (Mishkin's results, incidentally, suggest a negative real rate 
through the end of 1979, whereas Hester's measure turns positive in late 
1978.) 
One of the arguments for conducting policy in terms of real interest 
rates is that the meaning of the monetary aggregates has grown increas- 
ingly slippery, thus muddying the relation between such aggregates and 
more fundamental economic  variables. While  this  raises  considerable 
doubts about an aggregates policy, there can be a corresponding degree 
of slipperiness between real interest rates and other economic variables. 
For example, Hester raises the possibility that the interest rate futures 
market can alter the relation between business fixed investment and inter- 
est rates. Similarly, Hester acknowledges that high interest rates could 
breed innovation and thereby change the impact of interest rates on eco- 
nomic activity. Changes of this sort, emphasized in Wojnilower's recent 
paper (BPEA,  2:1980),  are worth noting. For one, the growth of variable- 
rate financial instruments means that a given interest rate will  not  be 
locked in and hence may not inhibit expenditures by as much as it would 
in the past. Similar effects may result from the reduced importance of 
interest rate ceilings (usury or otherwise),  which in the past might have 
served to restrict economic  activity by causing a credit crunch. These 
developments, in conjunction with new mortgage rate instruments includ- 
ing creative self-finance, have served to render housing activity somewhat 
more immune to given swings in interest rates. As these examples should 
make clear, the relation between real rates of interest and other funda- 
mental economic targets is also subject to change over time. 
By raising these various issues, I do not mean to negate Hester's main 
point that real interest rates are a proper and indeed necessary concern 
of monetary policy. Nevertheless, a discretionary monetary policy based 
on real interest rates is hardly straightforward, and a realistic evaluation 
of the likely success of such a policy is not a simple matter. The natural 
question is what is the alternative? At the moment, the only live option 
seems to be a policy based on monetary aggregates. Hester would have 
the Federal Reserve repudiate this approach. Although I can imagine the 
Federal Reserve leaning in this direction, as a matter of  political  and 
economic reality such action strikes me as a little impractical. At the very 
1. Frederic Mishkin, "The Real  Interest Rate; An  Empirical Investigation," 
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least, this ignores the considerable interest of both Congress and the cur- 
rent administration  in the pursuit of monetary targets. 
There is also the issue of the credibility of the Federal Reserve. By its 
actions, both on  October 6,  1979,  and subsequently, it reinforced the 
achievement of monetary targets as a basis for its report card. As much as 
the Federal Reserve may now find this criterion too confining, and there 
is evidence that this is the case, it cannot blithely abandon the monetary 
aggregates. At the very least, this would raise a number of questions about 
the response of private expectations to such a move. 
For better or worse, it appears to me to be likely that monetary targets 
will be around for some time to come. The danger that this presents for 
the economy is, however, not the one to which Hester devotes primary 
attention-a  real rate that was too low. Rather, it is the mindless pursuit 
of  steadily reducing monetary targets that could well  yield  a real rate 
that is too high and result in periods of economic overkill. 
On  balance  then,  I  would  certainly  support the  general  thrust of 
Hester's recommendations. The remaining problems seem to be twofold: 
how can we reduce the emphasis on mechanical targeting, and can we 
address the various issues with a practical policy on the real rate that will 
bolster its  attractiveness and retain the element of  accountability that 
some observers find desirable in an aggregates policy? 
General Discussion 
Many participants agreed with Hester's thesis that financial innova- 
tion alters the relation between the monetary aggregates and the rest of 
the economy. Albert Wojnilower argued that policy should try to regu- 
late the monetary system so  as to  discourage financial innovation  and 
thus maintain a more predictable environment for the conduct of mone- 
tary policy.  If  policymakers allow  the  system to  change, they will  be 
forced to attempt stabilization through ad hoc policies with little chance 
of  success. He  did not believe  that an emphasis on  real interest rates 
could provide stabilization in the face  of  innovations because  interest 
rates were less  decisive  than availability in  achieving control.  George 
von Furstenberg and James Tobin argued against excessive reliance on 
the real federal funds rate for stabilization because it was only one  of 
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from decisionmaking by firms and households,  and because its relation 
to other, more relevant rates was endogenous and might itself be affected 
by innovation. Tobin contended that policy should rely on all available 
information, including financial aggregates and interest rates, and attempt 
to judge how innovations are altering the meaning of this information for 
the conduct of policy. He also suggested the use of a money wage index 
in converting nominal interest rates to real rates. A wage index is a better 
estimate than a price index of the long-run rate of inflation, and a real 
interest rate in terms of labor may be more relevant for investment de- 
cisions. Alan Blinder added that, if the government issued indexed bonds, 
it would facilitate the use of real interest rates as a guide to policy. 
Robert Hall  agreed with Hester that stabilizing monetary aggregates 
was an inappropriate rule for the conduct of policy. However, Hall dis- 
agreed that maintaining positive real interest rates would necessarily slow 
the inflation rate. To accomplish that, he endorsed slowing nominal GNP 
as the appropriate target for monetary policy, using the real interest rate 
as an intermediate variable for  achieving that target. Alan  Greenspan 
replied that nominal GNP is only known with a considerable lag, making 
it a difficult measure to use in adjusting an interest rates policy. He and 
others found more merit in maintaining targets for monetary aggregates. 
Greenspan noted that, despite financial innovations, the velocity of M2 
has remained quite stable during the past two decades. Robert Gordon 
believed that the evidence on innovations did not change the verdict that, 
to slow the growth of nominal GNP, policy  should slow the growth of 
monetary aggregates. Charles Schultze reasoned that with the present 
chronic inflation rate well  above the growth targets for the aggregates, 
policy today would be judged restrictive for any plausible estimate of the 
distortion that innovations were making to the relation between the aggre- 
gates and GNP. Thus under virtually all reasonable forecasts the current 
targets for the monetary aggregates will provide the monetary authorities 
with a very useful political defense against attacks on their tight money 
policies,  even  though innovations  will  render unpredictable the  exact 
degree of  the resulting tightness. William Fellner  suggested subjecting 
new financial instruments to the same reserve requirements as their com- 
petitors, not just as a device to discourage innovation, but also to main- 
tain the original relation between reserves and nominal GNP, thus facili- 
tating the use of monetary aggregate targets. 
The panel then turned to  a discussion  of  the causes of  innovation. 
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portunity cost in the existing system rather than by the low opportunity 
cost  of  outside  money  that Hester  had  emphasized.  Wojnilower  sug- 
gested that interest rate spreads were as important as levels in encourag- 
ing innovation. Christopher Sims reasoned that regulation of the banking 
industry inherently creates an incentive to invent substitutes for banking 
services while  avoiding regulations, and that changes in the particular 
method of conducting policy are thus unlikely to remove the incentive to 
innovate. 
Several participants discussed the desirability of  innovations and of 
policies  to  control  them. Hall  and Greenspan advocated  allowing  all 
types of innovations because they improved economic efficiency and rea- 
soned that the Federal Reserve served no useful purpose in interfering 
with that process. David  Fand thought it important to  distinguish be- 
tween innovations that genuinely improve efficiency from those that sim- 
ply represent evasions of regulation. Sims pointed out there were good 
reasons for regulating the banking system, such as deposit insurance and 
the use of monetary policy for stabilization. Unless legal boundaries were 
maintained between the banking system and the intermediaries, mone- 
tary policy would become increasingly ineffectual. Thus the authorities 
had to regulate. Tobin suggested that it was easy to exaggerate the signifi- 
cance of disintermediation. If A lends to B at market interest rates, it is 
not of great macroeconomic consequence whether it occurs directly or 
through a bank. Important dimensions of innovations are the degrees to 
which they economize bank reserves and the extent to which they substi- 
tute market-rate assets for  controlled-rate  assets.  Wojnilower  advised 
classifying them by the degree to which the innovation extended the role 
of the Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort. 
Charles Holt suggested that econometric methods could be developed 
to model the relations needed for stabilization in the presence of innova- 
tion. He recommended regression techniques that allow for coefficients 
that drift over time by giving more weight to relatively recent observa- 
tions, logistic functions that allow for the diffusion of innovations, and 
Bayesian techniques that permit the incorporation of qualitative effects 
into estimation. 
Commenting on Hester's discussion of the developing market in inter- 
est rate futures, Sims observed that investment decisions would still de- 
pend on the opportunity cost of making them. Thus these decisions would 
remain sensitive to current interest rates even if firms covered their bor- 
rowing needs ahead of time in the futures market. 